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Examined Lives: Informational Privacy
and the Subject as Object
Julie E. Cohen*
In the United States, proposals for informational privacy protection have proved
enormously controversial. On a political level, such proposals threaten powerful data
p r o c e s s i n g i n t e r e s t s . O n a t h e o r e t i c a l l e v e l , d a t a p r o c e s s o r s a n d o t h e r d a t a p r i v a c y o pp o n e n t s a r g u e t h a t i m p o s i n g r e s t r i c t i o n s o n t h e c o l l e c t i o n , u s e , a n d e x c h a n g e o f p e rsonal data would ignore established understandings of property, limit individual
freedom of choice, violate principles of rational information use, and infringe data
processors’ freedom of speech. In this article, Professor Julie Cohen explores these
theoretical challenges to informational privacy protection. She concludes that categor i cal arguments from property, choice, “truth,” and speech lack weight, and mask funda mentally political choices about the allocation of power over information, cost, and
o p p o r t u n i t y . E a c h d e b a t e , a l t h o u g h c o u c h e d i n a r h e t o r i c o f i n d i v i d u a l l i b e r t y , e f f e ctively reduces individuals to objects of choices and trades made by others. Professor
Cohen argues, instead, that the debate about data privacy protection should be
grounded in an appreciation of the conditions necessary for individuals to develop and
exercise autonomy in fact, and that meaningful autonomy requires a degree of freedom
f r o m m o n i t o r i n g , s c r u t i n y , a n d c a t e g o r i z a t i o n b y o t h e r s . T h e a r t i c l e c o n c l u d e s b y c a l ling for the design of both legal and technological tools for strong data privacy protection.
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[T]he unexamined life is not . . . worth living.1
The distinctive discourse of modernity is one of prediction and control. . . .
Ironically, there is a profound helplessness in surrendering the future to prediction and control, and there would be even if we could predict and control things
at will. 2

I. INTRODUCTION : INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY AS PARADOX
Collections of information about, and identified to, individuals have existed for decades. The rise of a networked society, however, has brought
with it intense concern about the personal and social implications of such
databases—now, in digital form, capable of being rapidly searched, instantly
distributed, and seamlessly combined with other data sources to generate
ever more comprehensive records of individual attributes and activities.3 In
1995, with much fanfare, the European Union adopted its Directive on the
legal protection of personal identifying information (“European Data Protection Directive”).4 Although the United States has not followed suit—and
although powerful interests oppose the recognition of general privacy rights
in personal data—public concern about networked databases of personallyidentified information is on the rise. Congress is holding hearings 5 ; the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) is conducting investigations 6 ; the Admini1. P LATO, THE APOLOGY (attributing statement to Socrates), reprinted in R.E. ALLEN,
SOCRATES AND LEGAL OBLIGATION 37, 58 (1980).
2. ALBERT BORGMANN , CROSSING THE P OSTMODERN DIVIDE 2 (1992).
3. For a good summary of the sorts of “data mining” that networked databases make possible,
see generally A. Michael Froomkin, Flood Control on the Information Ocean: Living with Anonymity, Digital Cash, and Distributed Databases, 15 J.L. & COM . 395, 479-505 (1996).
4. Council Directive 95/46/EC on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing
of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L. 281) 31 [hereinafter Eur opean Data Protection Directive].
5. See, e.g., 143 CONG . REC . H5809 (daily ed. July 25, 1997) (statement of Rep. Vento) (discussing FTC privacy initiatives led by then-Commissioner Varney); 144 CONG . REC . S3136-37
(daily ed. Apr. 2, 1998) (statement of Sen. Jeffords) (describing congressional efforts to enact co mprehensive data privacy legislation). But see CENTER FOR PUBLIC I NTEGRITY, NOTHING SACRED :
T HE P OLITICS OF PRIVACY 7 (1998) (asserting that whenever Congress actually acts on privacyrelated matters, it invariably “turn[s] a privacy bill into a Trojan Horse for corporate privacy invaders”).
6. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, PRIVACY ONLINE : A REPORT TO CONGRESS, i-iv (1998)
(indicating the need for incentives for self-regulation of privacy online, but also noting a special
need for Congress to take action to protect children’s online privacy).
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stration has hired a “privacy czar”—the first such official in United States
history.7 There is much disagreement about what comes next, but there is
also a growing (if still inchoate) consensus that something needs to be done.
But privacy theory and privacy rhetoric do not know quite what to do
with the notion of “informational privacy.”8 Firms that traffic in personallyidentified data argue that the information collected, processed, and exchanged is both their property (because it is valuable) and their constitutionally-protected speech (because it is information). These arguments have a
certain intuitive appeal. In contrast, the notion that information about one’s
ordinary transactions and interactions with others should be secret, or otherwise subject to one’s personal control, strains the boundaries of our understanding of what it means for something to be secret, and what it means for
something to be owned. On a more theoretical level, meanwhile, the idea
that “privacy” might encompass an enforceable right to prevent the sharing
of (certain kinds of) personally-identified data seems to conflict with deeply
held social values that elevate choice over constraint, freedom of speech over
enforced silence, and “sunlight” over shadow.9
Or does it? Perhaps these categories—property, choice, speech, and
knowledge—are not so straightforward as they seem. In this article, I argue
that they are not. Conventional understandings of ownership, liberty, and
expression do not easily stretch to accommodate informational privacy
rights, but not because of any inherent incompatibility between privacy and
ownership, or between privacy and economic or expressive freedom. Rather,
the disjunct arises because these understandings are grounded in a theory of
self-actualization based on exchange—designed to minimize transaction
costs and other obstacles to would-be traders, and thus systematically, inevitably biased toward facilitating trade in personally-identified information.
They are grounded, as well, in a theory of the social role of information that
conceives information primarily as a lubricant to trade, and that seeks revealed truth about human potential (to be translated into trade advantage) in
the rationalized, regularized processing of observed facts.
It is possible to view personally-identified information and individuals’
claims to control it quite differently. But to do so requires that we under-

7. Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Clinton Names Counselor on Privacy, W ASH . P OST , Mar. 4, 1999,
at E2 (noting appointment of Peter Swire as Clinton’s chief privacy counselor); White House Appoints Ohio State Prof. Swire as First Privacy Czar, W ALL ST . J., Mar. 4, 1999, at A6 (discussing
Swire’s appointment).
8. In this article, I will use the terms “informational privacy” and “data privacy” interchangably.
9. See Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between Privacy
and Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. P A . L. REV . 1, 6-7 (1991) (“In general, scholarly
analysis of the First Amendment disposes us toward the proposition that more information is better.
We esteem ‘sunlight’ because it illuminates.”).
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stand how our categories constrain us. Parts II through V undertake that
task.
Parts II and III examine the “property” and “choice” objections to strong
data privacy rights. These objections rest on claims that data privacy protection would reduce liberty, both by interposing direct constraints on consensual market exchange and by undermining transactional efficiencies that
promote such exchange. Yet in both cases, the particular social meanings
ascribed to “liberty” and “efficiency” exclude from consideration other kinds
of liberty and other kinds of social benefit that data privacy protection might
promote. And in both cases, arguments from universal concepts of liberty
and efficiency conceal a basic inequality in fact. As a practical matter—that
is, given the way existing markets in personally-identified information actually work—the absence of data privacy protection elevates the liberty and
efficiency claims of data processors above those of individuals.
Part IV considers the “knowledge” argument against data privacy protection, which asserts that the collection, exchange, and processing of personally-identified data is valuable because it promotes greater scientific and
commercial understanding of individual behavior and desires. Without
doubt, the study of individual behavior can enhance our understanding of it.
Yet the paradigm of knowledge advanced by data privacy opponents rests on
a facile equivalence between socially-determined modes of information
processing and “truth” in all cases and for all purposes. It systematically
privileges one kind of information—static and quantifiable—and one kind of
knowledge—rationalizing and objectifying—at the expense of others at least
equally important to the human enterprise. And again, the consequence for
individuals is a loss, not a gain, in freedom; data-processing practices seek to
shape and predict individual behavior according to externally-determined
trajectories of opportunity and desire.
Part V addresses the argument that the collection and exchange of personally-identified data has intrinsic and constitutionally-protected value as
“speech.” This argument, too, is essentialist. It equates the market exchange
of information for value with the highest sort of protected expression, and
thus ignores that the relation between personally-identified information and
expression is far more complex, and far less direct. Although data privacy
protection clearly would affect the First Amendment rights of data processors, this is a strong argument against such protection only if it is assumed
that government has no legitimate interest in regulating the noncommunicative aspects of information markets, and that individuals have no
countervailing property or contractual interests of their own in controlling
their personal information. These assumptions, moreover, deny to individ uals (but not to data processors) the benefits of arguments from “property”
and “choice.”
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Regardless of the categorical lens through which the legal system views
data privacy claims, the result is the same. Our conceptions of property,
choice, and information reinforce one another; under all of them, individuals
are treated as the natural and appropriate objects of others’ trades, others’
choices, others’ taxonomies, and others’ speech. Part VI advances a vision
of data privacy protection grounded, instead, in a dynamic theory of individual autonomy. On this theory, one must, if one values the individual as an
agent of self-determination and community-building, take seriously a conception of data privacy that returns control over much personal data to the
individual. We must carve out protected zones of personal autonomy, so that
productive expression and development can have room to flourish. We can
do so—constitutionally—by creating a limited right against certain kinds of
commercial collection and use of personally-identified information.
I conclude, in Part VII, with some observations about the complementary
roles of law and technology in constructing an autonomy-centered regime of
informational privacy protection. In a networked world, law alone cannot
achieve effective protection of informational privacy, but that does not mean
that privacy legislation would be futile. Instead, legal protection for informational privacy can provide (additional) incentives for the development of
privacy-protective technologies.
II. OWNING
The data privacy debate is (in part) a debate about the ownership status
of a certain kind of information. The prevailing discourse of property rights,
however, lacks a term to describe the particular state of “ownedness” that
data privacy advocates seek for personal data. The state of being owned, in
our legal culture, means a particular, contingent set of relational attributes
thought to denote and promote trade. These are, roughly speaking, a condition of negative liberty for owners, an ethic of self-actualization through
market exchange, and an absence of friction. These characteristics are fundamentally irreconcilable with the privacy project as defined by data privacy
advocates. On their view, an effective data protection regime is defined by
the friction it interposes between would-be trading partners, and the limits it
sets on freedom to enter into agreements for the use of personal data.
The first task, then, is to consider whether these characteristics of things
“owned” reflect something essential about the nature of “property” in general
or personal information in particular. If so, laws imposing data privacy protection invariably will seem arbitrary and artificial, constraints to be evaded
by conduct and outpaced by technology. If not, the property lexicon needs
expansion to encompass the sort of ownership that the data privacy project
seeks to define.
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A. Why Ownership at All?
It may be objected, at the outset, that notions of “ownership” are (or
should be) irrelevant to the policy debate about data privacy. Within certain
sectors of the privacy community, there is a deep-seated resistance to property talk. This reaction is at once visceral and deeply principled. On the one
hand, the understanding of ownership that applies to, say, cars or shoes just
seems a crabbed and barren way of measuring the importance of information
that describes or reveals personality. But there is also a strong conviction
that ownership as an intellectual concept doesn’t encompass all of the legally
relevant interests that an informed privacy policy should consider—that
framing the privacy debate in terms of proprietary rights elides something
vitally important and conceptually distinct about the interests that the term
“privacy” denotes.10
Despite this opposition, property rhetoric has crept inexorably into the
privacy debate. Opponents of strengthened privacy protection think of collections of personally-identified data as “their” property; as evidence, they
point to their investment in compiling the databases and developing algorithms to “mine” them for various purposes. 11 Nor is property talk the exclusive province of privacy opponents. Some privacy advocates argue for
“tradable privacy rights”—entitlements that would vest initially in individ uals, but then could be freely exchanged for money, preferential service, or
other perceived benefits. 12 Others contend, in effect, that individuals already
enjoy such rights, and that the data privacy problem can be solved by adopting informed consent procedures that enable individuals to weigh privacy
costs accurately when deciding whether and how to surrender “their” information to others.13

10. See PAUL M. SCHWARTZ & JOEL R. REIDENBERG , DATA PRIVACY LAW : A STUDY OF
UNITED STATES DATA PROTECTION (1996); Pamela Samuelson, A New Kind of Privacy? Regulating Uses of Personal Data in the Global Information Economy, 87 CAL . L. REV . 751 (1999)
(reviewing Schwartz and Reidenberg’s discussion of European data protection) (book review).
11. See, e.g., Harris S. Gordon, Steven J. Roth, Scott J. Lieberman, Ann Zeller & Anne
McConnell, Customer Relationship Management: A Senior Management Guide to Technology for
Creating a Customer-Centric Business <http://www.the-dma.org/library/publications/customer
relationship.shtml> (discussing the importance of using personally-identified customer information
for more effective marketing).
12. See, e.g., James Glave, The Dawn of the Infomediary, W IRED NEWS , Feb. 24, 1999
<http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,18094,00.html>; John Hagel III & Jeffrey F. Rayport, The Coming Battle for Customer Information, HARV . BUS . REV ., Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 53 (discussing the role of intermediaries in data access negotiation and the potential benefits to
consumers); Kenneth C. Laudon, Markets and Privacy, COMM . ACM, Sept. 1996, at 92 (advocating
a regulated national information market).
13. See, e.g., PETER P. SWIRE & ROBERT E. LITAN , NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS : WORLD DATA
FLOWS , ELECTRONIC COMMERCE , AND THE EUROPEAN PRIVACY DIRECTIVE 156-70 (1998) (discussing various self-regulatory measures); see also Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace
Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV . 1193, 1287-94 (1998) (proposing a statute that would require any-
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One answer to the question “Why ownership?” then, is that it seems we
simply cannot help ourselves. Property talk is just how we talk about matters
of great importance. In particular, it is how we talk about the allocation of
rights in things, and personally-identified information seems “thingified” (or
detached from self) in ways that other sorts of private matters—intimate privacy, for example—are not. On this view, the “propertization” of the informational privacy debate is a matter of course; it merely testifies to the
enormous power of property thinking in shaping the rules and patterns by
which we live. The interesting questions, of course, are why this is so, and
what consequences follow from it.
On a slightly deeper level, recourse to property talk about privacy in
general, and data privacy in particular, seems linguistically determined. “Private,” of course, means “not public,” in the sense that a secret is not publicly
known. But “private” also means “not ‘common’”—owned, and set apart
from that which is common or owned by others. “Common,” moreover,
would not suffice to describe the desired characteristics of a strong data privacy regime. In our jurisprudence, things that aren’t owned by someone are
presumptively accessible to all, and frequently there for the taking by others.14 Data privacy advocates seek, instead, to guarantee individuals control
over their personal data. We lack a word for describing control over things
without legal or beneficial ownership of them—a word that signifies that the
thing described is both not common and not owned.
To note that privacy talk is embedded in the discourse of property, of
course, is to beg the question whether reality is similarly embedded. Some
philosophers argue that privacy has meaning only to the extent that it is reducible to a property interest.15 That may be so—but it may be so because
property talk imposes its own cognitive structure on reality. Once personally-identified information is conceived as an object separate from the self,
property talk follows naturally; it is how we talk about objects. At the same
time, however, it becomes more difficult to think of the information as having other characteristics, simply because property talk does not admit them.16

one acquiring personally-identified information from a cyberspace transaction to provide clear notice of intended uses of the information and to obtain the individual’s prior consent).
14. See CAROL M. ROSE , “Takings” and the Practices of Property: Property as Wealth,
Property as “Propriety,” in P ROPERTY AND PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY , T HEORY, AND
RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP 49, 53 (1994); Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SC I.
1243 (1968); cf. Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales,
Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN . L. REV. 129, 132-37 (1998) (discussing the concept of
“limited common property”).
15. See JUDITH JARVIS T HOMSON , THE REALM OF RIGHTS 285-88 (1990); Judith Jarvis
Thomson, The Right to Privacy, in P HILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY : AN ANTHOLOGY
272 (Ferdinand David Schoeman ed., 1984).
16. See generally GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON , METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1980)
(illustrating how we use metaphors to structure our experiences).
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In this sense, property language both describes and determines our exper ience of reality.
If personally-identified information is not to be considered a “thing”
subject to ownership, though, how should we think of it? What, exactly, is
conceptually distinct about privacy in general, or data privacy in particular?
Philosophers and legal scholars have struggled for decades to articulate a
compelling definition of privacy in other terms, as a locus of personal or dignitary interests.17 Contrasted with property talk, this language seems fuzzy;
the boundaries of things seem evident, but it’s harder to know where the
boundaries of dignity begin. A third explanation for property talk about privacy, then, is that property talk reflects a preference for boundedness, even at
the risk of oversimplification.
Which view is right? Is privacy only about assigning property interests
(in things), or is it about something more, or different, than ownership? And
does it matter—that is, does ceding privacy to the seductively crisp discourse
of property rights dictate a clear winner in the data privacy debate? How
large, in other words, is the risk? The questions cannot be answered without
a fuller exploration of what “property” means.
B. Theories of Ownership
Mainstream property theorists recognize two main theoretical justific ations for ownership: Lockean labor-desert theory, and a more explicitly
utilitarian theory that focuses on economic efficiency. As currently interpreted, these theories converge on a vision of property as constituted by and
defined through market exchange. This vision cannot support a broad conception of data privacy protection. Yet other strands of property theory pose
a progressive challenge to the prevailing understanding of property. Together, these alternative approaches might supply the building blocks for a
reconceptualization of personally-identified data as differently proprietary.
Labor-desert theory focuses on the right of self-determination and the
acquisition of property through the investment of labor. 18 On this theory, I

17. See JULIE C. INNESS , PRIVACY , INTIMACY AND I SOLATION 102-15 (1992); FERDINAND
DAVID SCHOEMAN , P RIVACY AND SOCIAL FREEDOM 14-23, 137 (1992); Stanley I. Benn, Privacy,
Freedom, and Respect for Persons, in NOMOS XIII: P RIVACY 1, 3-16 (J. Roland Pennock & John
W. Chapman eds., 1971) (discussing privacy in terms of respect for persons); John M. Roberts &
Thomas Gregor, Privacy: A Cultural View, in NOMOS XIII: PRIVACY , supra, at 199, 208 (exploring privacy within an indigenous community and its effect on village relationships and individual
self-esteem); Ferdinand David Schoeman, Privacy: Philosophical Dimensions, in PHILOSOPHICAL
DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY : AN ANTHOLOGY, supra note 15, at 1, 14-17; Arnold Simmel, Privacy Is
Not an Isolated Freedom , in NOMOS XIII: P RIVACY , supra, at 71, 71-74 (identifying privacy as a
cornerstone of the entire structure of human interaction).
18. See generally JOHN LOCKE , TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690); Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality
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might “own” the data generated by my actions, and therefore the right to
prohibit or condition its use by others. It is hard to see, though, how I would
have the right to control what another gathers through his or her own diligence, even if what is gathered is information about me. If the criterion of
ownership is effort, I will not always, or even most often, have the superior
claim.
Utilitarian theory, meanwhile, takes as its primary purpose maximizing
human satisfaction or benefit.19 Right away, this approach confronts the
thorny problem of what constitutes benefit and how to measure it. Latter-day
utilitarianism strives mightily to be agnostic on this matter, by defining satisfaction as whatever people choose to pursue, measured in terms of what they
are willing to pay. 20 The role of law, and especially property law, is simply
to promulgate rules that will facilitate wealth-maximizing transactions.21 A
thing becomes “property”—and appropriately so—when it can be fenced and
traded relatively costlessly. 22 On this view, personally-identified information
is properly the subject of trade in markets, and I might plausibly claim a right
to control the use and disclosure of information about me only to the extent
that I can outbid interested third parties.
In practice, labor and utilitarian theories of value overlap substantially to
support a vision of human self-determination as bound up with the consensual exchange of property for value. For utilitarians, this conclusion follows
straightforwardly from the account of preferences as revealed by behavior.
If what people do is the measure of what they want, then mutually-agreed
exchanges are definitionally utility-enhancing. 23 For Lockeans, the selfactualization value of trade follows from the investment of property with
self. The investment confers a presumptively unlimited right to control the
property’s disposition; what limits the right devalues the investment. 24 Under either theory, restrictions on the exchange of personally-identified data
make little sense.
and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993) (applying Lockean theory to intellectual property).
19. See generally Jeremy Bentham, Principles of Morals and Legislations, in 1 T HE W ORKS
OF JEREMY BENTHAM 1, 1-4, 11-12 (Thoemmes Press 1995) (1843).
20. See RICHARD A. P OSNER , ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 12-15, 568 (4th ed. 1988)
[hereinafter P OSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ]; RICHARD A. P OSNER, T HE PROBLEMS OF
JURISPRUDENCE 353–92 (1990) [hereinafter POSNER , P ROBLEMS ].
21. See POSNER , ECONOMIC ANALYSIS , supra note 20, at 36-39, 271-89; P OSNER ,
P ROBLEMS , supra note 20, at 357.
22. The classic statement of this approach is Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property
Rights, 57 AM . ECON. REV . 347 (1967).
23. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, The Ideology of the Economic Analysis of Law, 5 P HIL . & PUB.
AF F. 3, 32-41 (1975); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV . L. REV. 1849 (1987)
(describing a vision of universal commodification through market exchange and developing an
opposing theory based on the premise that noncommodification serves important human values).
24. See Radin, supra note 23, at 1888-90.
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Coexisting with the dominant liberal market-based understanding of
property, however, are a variety of critiques based on an understanding of
“property” as fundamentally relational. Under these theories, things deemed
property are not defined solely or even primarily by their exchange value, but
rather by the ways in which they shape the social relations between and
among persons.25 Several of these more recent strands of property theory
offer alternative visions of ownership that might inform the data privacy debate.
Margaret Jane Radin’s theory of property for personhood introduces two
crucial innovations. 26 The first is the idea that noneconomic or dignitary interests—say, those of a residential tenant—might preclude or restrict the
transfer of property by its nominal owner. 27 The second, and far more revolutionary, is that if we think of these possessory interests as “property,” we
acknowledge the possibility of a wholly new kind of concurrent estate, characterized by overlapping yet ontologically and functionally distinct interests
in things owned. Thus, personhood theory might support a dignity-based
claim to ownership of one’s personal data. Personhood theory, though,
seems an odd way of talking about my control over data that others already
possess. In this respect information seems fundamentally different than, for
example, housing, or wedding rings, or biological organs. Personallyidentified information is profligate; it casually escapes direct control. The
question is not how to allocate it given its scarcity, but how (or whether) to
regulate its abundance.
Here, the respective work of C. Edwin Baker and Joseph Singer complements Radin’s approach. Baker carefully disaggregates property into exchange, use, and other values, and argues that not all values or social
functions of property deserve the same degree of legal protection.28 In particular, he singles out the exchange value of property as an appropriate subject of regulation, because control over exchange implicates power over
people. 29 Singer, meanwhile, focuses on explicating property’s interdependence with social structures of authority and hierarchy.30 Together, Baker’s

25. This insight derives, initially, from the work of the Legal Realists. See Morris R. Cohen,
Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927); Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense
and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM . L. REV . 809 (1935).
26. See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood , 34 STAN. L. REV . 957 (1982).
27. See id. at 992-1002.
28. See C. Edwin Baker, Property and Its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty, 134
U. P A . L. REV . 741, 762 (1986).
29. See id. at 772.
30. See Joseph William Singer, Legal Theory: Sovereignty and Property, 86 NW . U.L. REV . 1
(1991); Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private Pro perty, 90 NW . U.L. REV . 1283 (1996) [hereinafter Singer, No Right to Exclude]; Joseph William
Singer, Re-Reading Property, 26 NEW ENG . L. REV . 711 (1992). For Singer, the “bundle of rights”
approach overlooks these questions. See Singer, No Right to Exclude, supra, at 1301. Yet Baker’s
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and Singer’s approaches suggest a way out of the difficulty generated by an
exclusive focus on things possessed by the party claiming a personhood in terest. A relational approach to personally-identified data might, but need
not, assign “ownership” or control of exchange based on possession. Instead, it might focus on some other consideration, such as (for example) ensuring that the individuals who are data subjects have greater power to
control third parties’ access to their transactional histories.
Neither Baker’s nor Singer’s work, however, tells us how we should decide whether personally-identified data (or any other “property”) warrants
such treatment. Liberal property theory’s answer to this question, of course,
is that this is precisely what we cannot and should not decide. To divide entitlements formerly perceived as unitary, and to hold nonexchange interests
privileged even in transactions between other, consenting parties, smacks of
a pernicious collectivism. Impediments to self-interested trade endanger liberty; conversely, a property regime that would promote liberty must facilitate
trade.
A different possible answer, though, lies in the work of scholars who
have advanced visions of property as facilitating the development of human
potential. Frank Michelman, Joan Williams and others articulate an essentially republican vision that emphasizes property’s role in ensuring an egalitarian distribution of political power and participation. 31 In addition,
Williams identifies a strain of (largely intuitive) theorizing about property
that she calls the “liberal dignity” vision. On this view, property rights may
not interfere with the basic respect due all persons. 32 Finally, Radin writes
more generally of “human flourishing,” in terms that encompass both individual and collective goals. 33 Under any of these theories, property is a
means to a larger end; it constitutes the individual’s stake in society and undergirds society’s vision of itself. These theories of property might support
restrictions on the exchange of personally-identified data if such restrictions
are judged important to the development of community and/or of individuality.
Where does this exploration of property theory leave us? Does a property-theoretic approach to privacy dictate, or privilege, a particular outcome
in the data privacy debate? Yes—but not necessarily. Equating “privacy”

work, which is explicitly about unbundling, drives toward very similar ends. See Baker, supra note
28, at 742-43 (arguing that different “sticks” in the bundle have different relational implications).
31. See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV . L. REV . 1165 (1967); Joan Williams, The Rhetoric
of Property, 83 IOWA L. REV . 277 (1998).
32. See Williams, supra note 31, at 343-52.
33. See MARGARET JANE RADIN , CONTESTED COMMODITIES 62-75 (1996); see also Martha
Nussbaum, Aristotelian Social Democracy, in LIBERALISM AND THE GOOD 203 (R. Bruce
Douglass, Gerald M. Mara & Henry S. Richardson eds., 1990).
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with “property” disfavors strong data privacy protection only to the extent
that our sense of what can be owned is limited by a platonic ideal of frictionless tradability. Other insights point the way toward a more nuanced understanding of the social and institutional roles of things deemed “property.”
In particular, they suggest that in some circumstances property might plaus ibly be defined as a constellation of characteristics to which the mainstream
vision gives short shrift: a nonexchange value; a prohibition on trade in
“things” too closely intertwined with self; and a sense of property as a requisite for both individual and collective development. I turn now to the question whether it would be good policy to do so.
C. Ownership, Liberty, and Friction
To offer encumbrance as a model for twenty-first century information
policy is to risk ridicule on two fronts. To data privacy opponents, such an
approach seems laughably retrograde. The prevailing view is that doctrinally
as well as theoretically, the modern law of property frowns on encumbrances
to trade, and that such restrictions invariably undermine both liberty and efficiency. In fact, though, the argument that property law categorically disfavors encumbrance is far too simple. Legal scholars have catalogued
numerous situations in which property law recognizes and enforces such restrictions.34 In particular, intellectual property law supplies strong precedent
for an encumbrance-based model of ownership in personally-identified data.
Intellectual property scholars, however, fear that the creation of property
rights in personally-identified data may lend support to more general arguments for new intellectual property rights in uncopyrightable facts.35 But the
parallels between intellectual property rights and strong data privacy protection do not require this result. Conceptual similarities between intellectual
property and data privacy protection demonstrate, instead, that “liberty” and
“efficiency” are not absolutes. The meanings we ascribe to them depend on
which burdens we choose to recognize as “costs” and which freedoms we
seek to promote. 36
Within property law generally, intellectual property is the paradigmatic
example of encumbered transfer based on substantive policy. One may buy a
34. See Williams, supra note 31, at 329-36, 356-58.
35. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Warren and Brandeis Redux: Finding (More) Privacy
Protection in Intellectual Property Lore, 1999 STAN . TECH . L. REV. VS 8 <http://stlr.stanford.edu/
STLR/Symposia/Privacy/99_VS_8>; Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information Property, 52
STAN . L. REV . 1283, 1294-95 (2000); Samuelson, supra note 10, at 769-72; Pamela Samuelson,
Privacy As Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN . L. REV . 1125, 1140-42 (2000); see also David G. Post,
Plugging In: Privacy, Property, and Cyberspace, AM . L AW ., Nov. 1997, at 98-99.
36. Cf. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 162-63 (1999) (“The
difference is in the underlying values that inform, or that should inform, information in each context.”). I am indebted to the members of the CyberProf listserv, especially Dan Burk, Peter Swire,
and Eugene Volokh, for a colloquy that suggested the analysis developed in this section).
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copy of a patented, copyrighted, or trademarked article, but the owner of the
intangible asset has rights that travel with the good and restrict its use. 37 This
is so for reasons that are explicitly utilitarian (in the more diffuse sense of
that term): According creators and inventors these rights promotes progress,
and also promotes wider public distribution of intellectual goods. 38 In the
case of copyright, these reasons are thought to justify granting authors a substantial degree of “dead hand” control of works.39
The trend in intellectual property law and policy, moreover, appears to
be toward ever-greater usage restrictions. These restrictions are couched in
the language of liberal property theory—they are “licenses” based on preexisting property rights, which confer the greater power of absolute control. 40
Their practical effect, though, is to diminish the freedom of purchasers to use
intellectual products as they wish. Indeed, they are valued precisely because
they do so, and justified in ways that seem to turn liberal property theory on
its head. Thus, for example, we are told that protecting the liberty interests
of users of intellectual goods would undermine social welfare, 41 and that it
37. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (providing remedies for trademark infringement); 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (delineating exclusive rights in copyrighted
works); 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (providing remedies for patent infringement).
38. See Eyal H. Barash, Experimental Uses, Patents, and Scientific Progress, 91 NW . U. L.
REV . 667, 667-70 (1997); Margaret Chon, Postmodern “Progress”: Reconsidering the Copyright
and Patent Power, 43 DEP AUL L. REV . 97, 98, 104-08 (1993); Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Policy
and the Limits of Freedom of Contract, 12 BERKELEY T ECH . L.J. 93, 98-101 (1997); Joseph
Fischer, Harmonization of Federal Patent and Trademark Laws After the Vornado, Zip Dee and
Betts Decisions: An Economic Analysis, 8 FED . CIRCUIT B.J., Summer 1998, at 29, 43-44; Robert
A. Kreiss, Accessibility and Commercialization in Copyright Theory, 43 UCLA L. REV . 1, 10-21
(1995); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J.
LEGAL STUD. 325, 326-27 (1989); Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual
Property Law, 75 T EX . L. REV . 989, 993-99 (1997); Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39
EMORY L.J. 965 (1990); Albert C. Smith & John W. Burns, Unethical or Essential, 8 J.
P ROPRIETARY RTS . (Oct. 1996). But see Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright’s Incentives-Access Paradigm , 49 VAND . L. REV . 483 (1996) (arguing that society also should consider the
opportunity cost created by the copyright regime, measured in terms of other, noncreative activities
that might produce greater social welfare); A. Samuel Oddi, Beyond Obviousness: Invention Protection in the Twenty-First Century, 38 AM . U.L. REV. 1097 (1989) (arguing that patents should
issue only for inventions that would not otherwise be produced).
39. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1994 and Supp. IV 1998) (setting the term of copyright at life of
the author plus seventy years); Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat.
2827, 2827-29 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 301-304 (Supp. IV 1998) (extending certain copyrights by
twenty years); Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995: Hearing on S.483 Before the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1995) (statements of Pat Alger, Nashville Songwriters Association
International; Shana Alexander; Ginny Mancini; Robert Lissauer; Carlos Santana; Mike Stoller)
(arguing that incentives rationale for copyright supported a twenty-year extension of copyright
term).
40. See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, The License Is the Product: Comments on the Promise of
Article 2B for Software and Information Licensing, 13 BERKELEY TECH . L.J. 891 (1998); Raymond
T. Nimmer, Breaking Barriers: The Relation Between Contract and Intellectual Property Law, 13
BERKELEY T ECH . L.J. 827 (1998).
41. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN , COPYRIGHT ’S HIGHWAY: T HE LAW AND LORE OF COPYRIGHT
FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX (1994); Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use:
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would be inefficient to require an intellectual property owner to outbid all
third parties who wish to use an intellectual product. 42
The vitality of encumbrance-based models within intellectual property
law complicates the account of ownership as negative liberty that is central
to liberal property theory. These models remind us that defining the bounds
of a property interest always requires choices between liberty claims. The
question is not one of freedom versus unfreedom, but of whose freedom to
prefer. 43
In particular, if (some) restrictions on use are good policy in the case of
intangible intellectual goods,44 it is fair to ask why we should presume that
restrictions on use of personally-identified data can never be good policy.
Certainly, one can posit policy goals that strong data privacy protection
might promote. These might include, for example, protection of individual
dignity, promotion of personal autonomy, and development of the capacity
for meaningful participation in the social and political life of the community.
In Part VI, I argue that we should treat these goals as important, and that
strong data privacy rights are the best way to promote them. For now, the
point is simply that the relative merits of encumbrance and tradability must
be assessed in context.
In the case of intellectual property, economic theory supplies a justific ation for choosing between liberty claims in a manner that imposes (at least
some) usage restrictions on recipients of intellectual goods. Intellectual
The Impact of Automated Rights Management on Copyright’s Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. REV .
557 (1998); Jane C. Ginsburg, Authors and Users in Copyright, 45 J. COPYRIGHT SOC ’Y 1 (1997).
42. See Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and
Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL . L. REV. 1293, 1306-07 (1996).
43. It is worth remembering that even “dead hand” control of land originally was seen as
safeguarding freedom, namely, that of landowners to keep ancestral lands within the family. But
the practice interfered with the freedom of heirs to use and transfer land as they pleased. As land
came to be valued more and more for its exchange value, a consensus emerged that the balance of
freedoms favored the heirs. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER , PROPERTY 282-84 (4th ed.
1998). The enforcement of restrictive covenants, however, cuts the other way: Such covenants
disfavor subsequent owners at the expense of original ones, and do so precisely to preserve their
intent that land remain dedicated to its original (typically residential) uses. See Williams, supra
note 31, at 284. As Williams demonstrates, the prevailing theory of property as conferring unrestricted rights of use and exchange cannot explain the cases, which seem to rest on a substantive
preference for certain uses above others. See id.
44. I have argued that, past a certain point, they are not. See Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of “Rights Management,” 97 MICH. L. REV . 462, 538-59
(1998). For purposes of this article, though, whether that is correct is beside the point. The point is
that we matter-of-factly invoke the property rights of some to limit the liberty interests of others,
and that we do so to effectuate social policy choices. It does not necessarily follow, in other words,
that intellectual property and data privacy should be treated the same way. Cf. LESSIG , supra note
36, at 161-63 (explaining why a particular data management architecture might address societal
concerns about data privacy even though it would not address parallel concerns about access to
intellectual property). The example of intellectual property shows the plasticity of arguments from
liberty and efficiency, not their inevitability.
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products have strong public good characteristics, and (at least in theory)
would be underproduced without the additional incentives that intellectual
property law supplies.45 Economic theory also indicates, though, that these
entitlements should be limited. Copyright’s public access and use privileges,
for example, play an important role in stimulating further creative efforts,
and so produce important social benefits that in turn would be underproduced
if authors were granted more complete control. 46 Intellectual property law,
in short, seeks the balance of rights and limitations that will best promote the
twin goals of progress and widespread public distribution of intellectual
goods. 47
In the case of personally-identified data, economic theory similarly favors allocating ownership rights to the individuals who are in some sense the
“creators” of the data, but for very different reasons. Incentives play little
role in the analysis; personally-identified data is not scarce. 48 Instead, because bargaining over initial entitlements is not costless, economic theory
indicates that the property right should be assigned initially to individuals,
who would incur higher costs to bargain for it. 49 Nor is there a compelling
need to encourage the production of collections of personally-identified data.
Unlike traditional intellectual goods, these databases have no significant
public good characteristics. Instead, they are the paradigmatic example of a
good whose entire value is privately appropriable, and whose creation ther efore requires no additional public subsidy. 50
45. See, e.g., Elkin-Koren, supra note 38, at 98-100; William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing
the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV . L. REV . 1659, 1700-04 (1988); Landes & Posner, supra note 38,
at 326-33. But see Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books,
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV . L. REV . 281 (1970) (arguing that abolishing
copyright law would not substantially affect incentives for book production); Gillian K. Hadfield,
The Economics of Copyright: An Historical Perspective, 38 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP . (ASCAP) 1, 14
(1988) (suggesting that “much of the perceived need for protection in early analyses in fact arose
from or was reinforced by the fact of large ‘economies of scale’ in publishing (augmented by high
levels of uncertainty) rather than the ‘public goods’ problem . . . .”).
46. See Cohen, supra note 44, at 542-51; Landes & Posner, supra note 38, at 332-33, 347-53;
Lemley, supra note 38, at 1056-58; Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach to
Fair Use in an Era of Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J. I NTELL. P ROP . L. 1, 49-56 (1997).
47. See U.S. CONST . art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Cohen, supra note 44, at 542-51; Elkin-Koren, supra
note 38, at 98-101; Kreiss, supra note 38; Landes & Posner, supra note 38, at 326-37; Lemley,
supra note 38, at 993-99; Litman, supra note 38.
48. Without question, the possibility of monitoring or profiling may affect incentives to engage in certain types of transactions or activities. See notes 188-230 infra and accompanying text.
But with the possible (though apocryphal) exception of the hermit on the mountaintop, everyone
transacts.
49. See Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON . 1 (1960); see also DANIEL
W . BROMLEY , ECONOMIC I NTERESTS AND I NSTITUTIONS : THE CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF
P UBLIC P OLICY 118-21, 134-43, 165-81 (1989) (illustrating that different initial entitlement structures lead to different equilibrium points).
50. See Jack Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity, 61 AM . ECON . REV . 561 (1971). Arguably, collections of personally-identified
data have public-good characteristics to the extent that they enable vendors to allocate goods and
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Here, the liberal property rights tradition offers a different efficiencybased objection to proposals for granting individuals ongoing ownership
rights in personally-identified information. Citing the cost of negotiating and
enforcing ongoing data protection provisions, data privacy opponents argue
that increased protection would impose unreasonable costs on routine consumer transactions—costs that consumers themselves ultimately will have to
bear. 51 Thus, even assuming that greater data privacy protection is desirable
for reasons related to personal dignity, they contend that the social costs of
enhanced privacy would be too great. Implicitly, this argument rests on a
liberty claim as well. “Unnecessary” transaction costs are a species of indirect restraint on liberty; imposing them would offend the principle that laws
about “property” should facilitate trade.
Again, though, the example of intellectual property shows that the relationships between friction and social benefit, and between friction and liberty, are more complicated than mainstream property theory suggests.52
Current trends in copyright law and theory favor the adoption of digital tech-

services to those consumers who want them (and are able to pay) the most. As Part III B discusses,
though, targeted marketing doesn’t just seek to satisfy existing desires; it seeks to create new ones.
To a substantial degree, these desires are “relative preferences”—preferences for the satisfaction
gained by improving one’s (consumptive) lot relative to others. Fulfillment of relative preferences
generates no net increase in social utility; if anything, it decreases social utility by fueling zero-sum
spending races and by diverting resources from the satisfaction of other wants. See Viet D. Dinh,
Forming and Reforming Wants, 85 GEO . L.J. 2121, 2130 (1997).
Collections of data gathered from individuals also may have public good characteristics when
they are generated and used to support socially valuable research. These cases, however, are distinguishable from those in which the databases are pure private goods by the fact that the data gathered
and disseminated purely for research need not remain personally-identifiable. At most, then, the
public goods argument would support drafting a privacy rule that treats the two sorts of databased
differently. See text accompanying notes 207-215 infra. In addition, there are other ways to encourage the creation of databases for research. See generally Brett Frischmann, Innovation and
Institutions: Rethinking the Economics of U.S. Science and Technology Policy, 24 VT . L. REV . 347
(2000) (discussing grant funding and tax incentives). Whether data processors should be entitled to
any legal protection for existing, already-created databases is a separate question, which this article
does not address.
51. See SOLVEIG SINGLETON , PRIVACY AS CENSORSHIP : A SKEPTICAL VIEW OF PROPOSALS
TO REGULATE PRIVACY IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR (Cato Inst. Policy Analysis No. 295, 1998); see
also Simon G. Davies, Re-Engineering the Right to Privacy: How Privacy Has Been Transformed
from a Right to a Commodity, in T ECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY : T HE NEW LANDSCAPE 143, 161
(Philip E. Agre & Marc Rotenberg eds., 1997) (“The cost factor is a powerful weapon in the armory
of privacy invaders because it implies that a few ‘fundamentalists’ will force a rise in the production cost of an item of a service.”). But see Laudon, supra note 12, at 102-03 (noting and rejecting
this argument).
52. It is equally clear that traditional property law is comfortable imposing heightened transaction costs in some contexts. Again, restrictive covenants supply an easy example; allowing initial
landowners to impose use restrictions creates substantial information and renegotiation costs for
subsequent owners. The cases largely avoid consideration of costs by relying on the fiction of notice implied from the circumstances, even though the range of circumstances recognized as legally
sufficient is so great as to give even the most savvy purchaser pause. See Williams, supra note 31,
at 356-58.
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nologies that enforce usage restrictions for digital works.53 From a technological standpoint, personal data encumbered with usage restrictions are no
different than digital works similarly encumbered. Yet digital “rights management” technologies have not encountered transaction cost objections; indeed, quite the opposite is true. Intellectual property owners and many legal
commentators argue that rights management technologies will reduce the
transaction costs that attend the licensing of intellectual products.54
Library, educational, and consumer groups, meanwhile, have objected
that technologically-enforced usage restrictions impose new and unwarranted
burdens on users of copyrighted works.55 This objection to digital rights
management technologies is not perceived (or presented) as an objection to
costs. But plainly it is; the new technologies are designed to impose new
transactional barriers to uses formerly available without negotiation or
charge. 56 Plainly too, the objection is about more than costs: Opponents of
digital rights management technologies argue that allocating the “costs” of
privileged uses to authors, and through them to society at large, serves important social values—values that would not be served to the same extent by
requiring all would-be users to pay for all uses. 57 It is hard to escape the
conclusion that the identification of particular costs as “friction” to be eliminated depends on other, normative considerations.
And so, in one sense, the intellectual property and data privacy debates
are not inconsistent at all. A world with ongoing usage restrictions for intellectual property, but not for personally-identified data, is a world in which
the liberty claims of individuals count for less than those of publishers and
data processors, and in which the social benefits (or efficiencies) arising
53. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304 (1998) (codified as amended
at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-05 (1999)); CHRISTOPHER BURNS , INC ., COPYRIGHT MANAGEMENT AND THE
NII: REPORT TO THE ENABLING TECHNOLOGIES COMMITTEE OF THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN
P UBLISHERS (1995); I NFORMATION I NFRASTRUCTURE T ASK FORCE , UNITED STATES ,
I NTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION I NFRASTRUCTURE : T HE REPORT OF
THE W ORKING GROUP ON I NTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS , 230-34 (1995); P ETER W AYNER,
DIGITAL COPYRIGHT PROTECTION (1997); Bell, supra note 41; Mark Stefik, Shifting the Possible:
How Trusted Systems and Digital Property Rights Challenge Us to Rethink Digital Publishing, 12
BERKELEY T ECH . L.J. 137 (1997); IMPRIMATUR, Project Documents <http://www.imprimatur.
alcs.co.uk/final/>.
54. See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN , supra note 41, at 170, 224; Bell, supra note 41, at 581-84; Robert
P. Merges, The End of Friction? Property Rights and Contract in the “Newtonian” World of OnLine Commerce, 12 BERKELEY T ECH . L.J. 115, 130-34 (1997); Stefik, supra note 53, at 146-47.
55. See Hearing on H.R. 2281 & 2280 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Pro perty of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Douglas Bennett,
President, Earlham College, on behalf of the Digital Future Coalition); Digital Future Coalition,
Collected Position Papers, Letters, and Press Releases <http://www.dfc.org/>.
56. See Cohen, supra note 44, at 471-73.
57. Proponents of digital rights management technologies argue that costs placed on authors
and publishers will be passed through to consumers. This is clearly right—but it does not follow
that costs will be borne by the same people, in the same proportions. See id. at 498-504, 542-51,
556-59.
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from market-encumbrance are deemed less valuable than those arising from
trade. But the inequality that flows from the data privacy debate is even
more profound. Even absent ongoing usage restrictions, an initial allocation
of entitlements in personally-identified information to data processors shifts
enormous wealth away from individuals, and does so without even acknowledging the shift, much less offering any tenable justification. 58
Juxtaposing the data privacy debate with the politics of intellectual property thus exposes an ideological fault line within the transaction costs approach to designating property interests. The designation as “transaction
cost” has political valence. Decisions to retain (or increase) some costs and
eliminate others may be decisions about cost (and wealth) allocation as well.
Moreover, some costs may have instrumental or production value that outweighs the short-term loss they impose. 59 In the case of data privacy, we
might conclude, for example, that placing some cost burden on processors
and users of personally-identified data promotes greater respect for individual dignity than requiring individuals to purchase their privacy against a default rule of no-privacy. Under one allocation, the costs of privacy are borne
by society generally; under the other, the costs are borne by those individuals
who both desire privacy and can afford it (and the costs of no-privacy are
borne by everyone else). The two outcomes are not equivalent, and we cannot choose between them based on an abstract injunction to “minimize
costs.”
The point sharpens where digital information systems are concerned. As
the example of intellectual property suggests, the belief that encumbrance
inevitably trades against efficiency is simplistic. Transaction costs are a
function of system design, and system design, in turn, is based on sociallydetermined conceptions of efficiency. 60 Thus far, whether deliberately or by
oversight, we have constructed data processing systems that do not involve
the individual in decisionmaking about the uses of data collected by the system. 61 Yet the same technologies that enable distributed rights-management
functionality might enable the creation of privacy protection that travels with
data—obviating the need for continual negotiation of terms, but at the same
time redistributing “costs” away from the individuals who are data subjects.

58. See Paul Farhi, Me Inc.: Getting the Goods on Consumers, W ASH . P OST , Feb. 14, 1999, at
H1 (arguing that marketing researchers doing phone surveys are getting “something for nothing”);
Laudon, supra note 12, at 99.
59. See Cohen, supra note 44, at 542-51, 559-59; Pierre Schlag, The Problem of Transaction
Costs, 62 S. CAL . L. REV . 1661 (1989).
60. See Philip E. Agre, Beyond the Mirror World: Privacy and the Representational Practices
of Computing, in T ECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY : T HE NEW LANDSCAPE , supra note 51, at 29; Herbert Burkert, Privacy-Enhancing Technologies: Typology, Critique, Vision, in T ECHNOLOGY AND
P RIVACY: T HE NEW LANDSCAPE, supra note 51, at 125.
61. See Burkert, supra note 60, at 137.
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Whether we should do so depends on whether this allocation of costs is the
best one.
*

*

*

*

Property talk about data privacy creates both risk and opportunity. Property rights effectuate policy choices; at the same time, though, property
rhetoric may seem to privilege certain choices above others. Recognizing
property rights in personally-identified data risks enabling more, not less,
trade and producing less, not more, privacy. But defining these rights, instead, in terms of encumbrance, along the general lines suggested by the intellectual property model, offers the possibility of a privacy paradigm that
returns fine-grained, ongoing control to the individual. The perceived opposition between strong data privacy and property is part ideology and part
technological artifact. Current systems for processing transactions are designed to facilitate a one-time surrender of control over personal information,
but they need not be. Within particular system parameters—which are in
turn a function of social parameters that define acceptable information policy—ownership can be both “sticky” and efficient. The design of such systems is a matter of choice. Next to consider, then, is how we should choose.
III. CHOOSING
The data privacy debate is also a debate about freedom of choice and its
necessary preconditions. The prevailing approach to this question is closely
aligned with the position that personally-identified data becomes “property”
when, and because, it becomes tradable: A successful data privacy regime is
precisely one that guarantees individuals the right to trade their personal information for perceived benefits, and that places the lowest transaction cost
barriers in the way of consensual trades. If individuals choose to trade their
personal data away without placing restrictions on secondary or tertiary uses,
surely it is their business.62 On this view, choice rather than ownership is (or
should be) the engine of privacy policy. What matters most is that personal
data is owned at the end of the day in the manner the parties have agreed.
Theories of privacy-as-choice, however, do not seem to contemplate the
exercise of this freedom in nonmarket realms. “Choice” is something that
occurs within existing constraints but not about them. This Part considers
whether that is necessarily so—whether, in other words, there is something
about that sort of choice that makes it the freest.

62. See SWIRE & L ITAN , supra note 13; Peter P. Swire, Markets, Self-Regulation and Government Enforcement in the Protection of Personal Information , in U.S. DEPT . OF COMMERCE ,
P RIVACY AND SELF -REGULATION IN THE I NFORMATION AGE (1997) [hereinafter Swire, Markets]
<http://www.osu.edu/units/law/swire.htm>.
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A. Theories and Technologies of Choice
Adherents of the privacy-as-choice model contemplate that as data privacy becomes more important to consumers, privacy preferences and practices will become specified contractual terms in most ordinary online
interactions.63 To make this a concrete possibility, technology companies
have invested heavily in the development of technologies for managing data
privacy preferences. In theory, these technologies, most notably the World
Wide Web Consortium’s Platform for Privacy Preferences (“P3P”), will allow individuals to create tailored profiles that specify permitted and prohibited uses of their personal data. 64 The profiles will act as digital passports
that negotiate privacy terms with vendors’ websites. If the vendor offers less
privacy protection than the individual wants, the profile will alert the individual and offer the option to transact on the vendor’s terms. 65
Like the justifications for property ownership discussed in Part II.B, 66 the
theoretical antecedents of a data privacy regime based on “freedom of
choice” mingle strands of Lockean and utilitarian libertarianism. Under
utilitarian theory—especially in its economic incarnation—market exchanges
reflect the expression and satisfaction of preferences. 67 Definitionally, market exchange makes people better off; it follows that the law should seek to
maximize opportunities to make data privacy practices the subject of exchange. From Lockean theory, meanwhile, comes an emphasis on selfdetermination through freedom from limits on the accumulation and disposition of property. The disposition right is inseparably linked with the accumulation right.68 Conversely, then, interference with exchange reduces the
63. See LESSIG, supra note 36, at 159-63.
64. See Joseph Reagle & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Platform for Privacy Preferences, COMM .
ACM, Feb. 1999, at 48, 48 (arguing that websites can bolster users’ confidence by clarifying their
privacy policies upfront and allowing visitors to become active participants in the decisionmaking
process). For websites providing customers with information about tools for construction of their
own privacy profiles see, e.g., W3C, The Platform for Privacy Preferences 1.0 (P3P 1.0) Specification <http://www.w3.org/TR/P3P>; SuperProfile, What Is a Superprofile <http://www.superprofile.
com/sprofile.html>; Privaseek, Privacy Tools <http://www.privaseek.com>. In fact, as privacy
experts have documented, the P3P project has experienced numerous delays, in part because industry sponsors have been unable to reach consensus on the level of privacy protection to enable. See
Joel R. Reidenberg, Restoring Americans’ Privacy in Electronic Commerce, 14 BERKELEY T ECH .
L.J. 771, 778-79 (1999); Marc Rotenberg, What Larry Doesn’t Get: Fair Information Practices and
the Architecture of Privacy, 2000 STAN . T ECH . L. REV . ¶¶ 63-66 (2000) <http://stlr.stanford.edu/
STLR/Working_Papers/00_Rotenberg_1>.
65. See Reagle & Cranor, supra note 64, at 49; see also Online Privacy Alliance, (Sept. 20,
1999) <http://www.privacyalliance.com/resources/rulesntools.shtml> (discussing different types of
privacy tools and privacy “infomediaries”).
66. See notes 18-33 supra and accompanying text.
67. See NICHOLAS MERCURO & STEVEN G. MEDEMA , ECONOMICS AND THE LAW : FROM
P OSNER TO P OST -MODERNISM 13-18, 57-60 (1997).
68. Locke himself recognized two sorts of limits on the freedom to accumulate: One must not
accumulate property only to waste it, and one must leave “enough, and as good . . . for others.”
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accumulation incentive; it follows that the law should not prevent individuals
from managing their own wealth.
The privacy-as-choice model differs in some respects from the propertyrights approach explored in Part II.C above. 69 The model implicitly concedes initial ownership to individuals. At the same time, however, it presumes both the ability and the desire to alienate personal information (on the
right terms), and thus devalues the argument that ownership necessarily includes the right to assert ongoing control. Ongoing control exists only as a
matter of contract, and only to the extent that the data processor is willing to
agree. Nor is there any serious discussion of digitally self-enforcing access
and usage rights, which might create ongoing control on a de facto basis.
(One suspects that it is no coincidence that the “transaction cost” objection to
data privacy management plays a much less significant role in discussions of
privacy-as-choice.) Instead, the contract model relies on self-enforcement of
privacy practices by vendors themselves. Dishonest vendors, the reasoning
goes, will lose credibility and market share. 70
The theory of privacy-as-choice predicts that, eventually, the technologically-mediated market for a given product or service will reach an equilibrium based on the privacy practices that most consumers prefer. 71 If, for
example, most consumers prefer that their credit card companies or magazine
publishers make their names and addresses available to “selected” purveyors
of other products and services, the status quo will remain the norm. If most
consumers prefer no data-sharing, then that practice will prevail. If enough
consumers, or enough profitable consumers, prefer something different, a
smaller market will evolve to serve them as well.
It seems churlish to contest this rosy vision of a market for privacy, or to
argue that we should expect more choice, or different kinds of choice, than
the market will provide. Economic and political theorists, however, recognize that choice is both more constrained and more complicated than theories
of privacy-as-choice would suggest. Choice occurs within parameters.
Some of these parameters, such as the fact that we need gravity to walk and
oxygen to breathe, are relatively fixed. Others, such as the design of legal
LOCKE , supra note 18, at §§ 27, 31. He resolved both limits by positing freedom of exchange.
Trading perishable commodities for imperishable currency avoids waste, and transfers perishables
to those who need them. See id. at §§ 46-48. The background conditions that supported this reasoning have changed substantially since Locke’s day, but the belief that markets cure distributional
inequities has not. For a persuasive critique of the linkage between accumulation and disposition of
property, see Baker, supra note 28.
69. See notes 34-61 supra and accompanying text.
70. See Swire, Markets, supra note 62; cf. Paola Benassi, TRUSTe: An Online Privacy Seal
Program , COMM. ACM, Feb. 1999, at 56. Swire distinguishes between two versions of this model:
“pure market” and “self-regulation” by formal and informal industry associations. Under either
version, though, the discipline is supplied by market entities rather than by law.
71. See LESSIG, supra note 36, at 159-63.
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institutions and technological tools, are slightly more malleable; they are, in
other words, themselves the subject of choices.72 The debate about privacy
and freedom of choice is, in fact, two debates—one about the conditions of
choice within a given set of institutions or parameters (here, the evolving,
relatively unregulated market for personally-identified data), and one about
the parameters themselves. And if “freedom of choice” includes the freedom
of self-determination writ large, then it necessarily includes the freedom to
use nonmarket means to change the parameters within which markets operate. The question is whether it would be desirable to do so.
Economic and political markets offer different constraints. Adherents of
market choice argue that nonmarket choices constrain nonsubscribers, while
market choices do not. One may be bound by a choice inconsistent with
one’s own vote and, presumably, with one’s own preferences or views about
self-determination. In markets, by contrast, one may trade or not trade as
one pleases. Thus, some argue that substantive regulation of transaction
terms is inherently freedom-destroying.73 But of course third-party constraints do obtain in markets—if one has unusual tastes or belongs to a customer group perceived as fickle or unprofitable, one may be limited to
product offerings designed for others’ preferences.74 One constraint is no
more neutral than the other; they are simply different. Social policy generally reflects some combination of the two. In our culture, for example, it is
usually unacceptable to impose nonmarket constraints on speech—but that
decision was and is a political one.
Economic and political markets also offer different freedoms. Economic
markets are, generally speaking, a good forum for the expression and satisfaction of purely consumption-related preferences. They are, however, a
much poorer forum for expression and satisfaction of second-order preferences about the sorts of behavior the law should encourage or discourage. 75
They are also a poor forum for the resolution of issues that we as a society
believe, either for reasons of market failure or for normative reasons, should

72. See BROMLEY , supra note 49; LESSIG, supra note 36; see also Lawrence Lessig, The New
Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD . 661 (1998).
73. See SINGLETON , supra note 51; Solveig Singleton, Reviving a First Amendment Absolu tism for the Internet, 3 T EX . REV . L. & POL ’ Y. 279 (1999) [hereinafter Singleton, Reviving]; cf. Bell,
supra note 41, at 607-08 (arguing that copyright fair use doctrine resembles a contract of adhesion
if it constrains private contracts).
74. See BROMLEY , supra note 49, at 65-66.
75. See G. PETER PENZ , CONSUMER SOVEREIGNTY AND HUMAN I NTERESTS 41-58 (1986);
Cass R. Sunstein, Disrupting Voluntary Transactions, in NOMOS XXXI: MARKETS AND JUSTICE
279, 285-87 (John W. Chapman & J. Roland Pennock eds., 1989); Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV . 1129, 1133-35, 1140-45 (1986).
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be decided based on votes rather than dollars.76 Political markets perform
precisely this function.
Finally, economic and political markets suffer from different dysfunctions. Market failure may arise from disparities of power, from high or unevenly distributed bargaining costs, from failure to absorb negative
externalities (or to reproduce positive ones), or from information asymmetries that preclude the exercise of informed choice. 77 The mechanisms for
exercising freedom of choice in political markets, in turn, are subject to collective action problems and interest group corruption. 78 Public choice theory
tells us that there will be substantial overlap between economic and political
outcomes, and plainly this is correct. Plainly too, though, there are occasions
when the different bases for decisionmaking in economic and political markets may translate into different results.79
Inescapably, then, selection of the forum for choice about data privacy
depends (at least in part) on the nature of the policy sought to be implemented. A substantive preference for trade in personally-identified information is more easily implemented in economic markets. A substantive
preference for durable privacy, or for privacy as to certain items of information, may be more easily or effectively implemented in political ones. Before we can decide (or even decide how to decide), we must assess whether
privacy-as-choice will guarantee durable privacy for those who prefer it.
B. Choice, Parameters, and Tradeoffs
The privacy-as-choice model is conceived as empowering individuals.80
Whether that is true, however, depends on the baseline for comparison.
76. See Cohen, supra note 44, at 552-55; Victor P. Goldberg, Institutional Change and the
Quasi-Invisible Hand, 17 J.L. & ECON . 461, 481 (1974); Herbert Hovenkamp, Legislation, WellBeing, and Public Choice, 57 U. CHI. L. REV . 63 (1990); Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV . 2121 (1990); Maxwell L. Stearns, The Misguided Renaissance of Social
Choice, 103 YALE L.J. 1219 (1994).
77. Cf. ROBERT COOTER & T HOMAS ULEN , LAW AND ECONOMICS 38-41 (3d ed. 2000). The
differences between my formulation and the textbook definition are deliberate. Elsewhere, I have
shown that “market power” is not the only kind of power that matters in markets, and that the expansion of markets to absorb formerly uncompensated positive externalities may decrease overall
social utility rather than enhancing it. See Cohen, supra note 44, at 517-51.
78. See MANCUR OLSON , THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION : P UBLIC GOODS AND THE
T HEORY OF GROUPS 2 (1965) (arguing that rational self-interested individuals will not act to
achieve their common group interets); JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON T ULLOCK, T HE
CALCULUS OF CONSENT : LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962); T HE
P OLITICAL ECONOMY OF RENT -SEEKING (Charles K. Rowley, Robert O. Tollison & Gordon Tullock eds., 1988).
79. See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY , LAW AND P UBLIC CHOICE : A CRITICAL
I NTRODUCTION (1991); DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, P ATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE
T HEORY: A CRITIQUE OF APPLICATIONS IN P OLITICAL SCIENCE (1994).
80. See LESSIG, supra note 36, at 159-63.
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Plainly, the model would give individuals more power over uses of their personal data than they currently enjoy. At the very least, P3P and similar technologies might supply a reliable, automatic means of communicating privacy
preferences to vendors, where none now exists. It seems difficult to dispute
that a system based on accurate information and routinized use of P3P-type
profiles would offer some advantages compared with current commercial
practice, which affords individuals no enforceable data privacy protection. If
we are serious about choice, though, we also must consider the structural
choices that privacy-as-choice forecloses. In addition, we must consider the
economic and political consequences of a choice to restrict choice about data
privacy to the marketplace.
Freedom of choice in markets requires accurate information about
choices and their consequences, and enough power—in terms of wealth,
numbers, or control over resources—to have choices.81 The privacy-aschoice model reinforces persistent inequalities on both counts.
First, to assess the benefits and costs of a trade accurately, individuals
must understand the uses contemplated for the information they are asked to
disclose. 82 Proponents of “choice” as the basis for privacy policy differ on
exactly how this is best accomplished. Some advocate greater regulation of
privacy disclosures; others argue that the same market principles that produce privacy also will foster disclosure. 83 All agree, though, that digital network technologies enable easy disclosure of privacy policies and practices at
a far greater level of detail than feasible in off-line transactions.
In reality, individuals face enormous difficulty assessing how their personal information will be used.84 The decision about how much information
a privacy policy should provide is hotly contested. The problem is especially
acute for secondary and tertiary uses of personally-identified information.
Routine practice is to specify these classes of recipients only in the most

81. In theory, choice exists as long as the individual can refuse the transaction. I am concerned here, however, with options beyond the choice to accept or reject the lowest-priced, most
privacy-invasive offer.
82. See COOTER & ULEN , supra note 77, at 38-41 (listing information asymmetry among the
causes of market failure).
83. Compare Kang, supra note 13 (advocating statutorily required disclosures), with SWIRE &
LITAN , supra note 62 (advocating industry self-regulation), Swire, Markets, supra note 62 (same),
and Individual Reference Service Group, White Paper (Dec. 1997) <http://www.irsg.org/html/
white_paper.htm> (same).
84. For a thorough and illuminating exploration of the information problems and other costs
that confront individuals seeking to protect their privacy, see Jeff Sovern, Opting In, Opting Out, or
No Options at All: The Fight for Control of Personal Information , 74 W ASH. L. REV . 1033 (1999);
see also Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and the Economics of Personal Health Care Information, 76
T EX . L. REV. 1, 47-51 (1997) (discussing information problems that confront health care consumers).
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general terms.85 Yet without information about the nature and identity of
secondary and tertiary users, individuals cannot easily determine what ni formation to provide or withhold.
Even assuming perfect information about all contemplated reuses of
data, however, consumer freedom is relative. Individual consumers are free
to accept or reject the terms offered, but it is the vendor who is free to decide
what terms to offer in the first place. 86 Thus, consumers may discover that
the surrender of personal information is nonnegotiable or prohibitively
priced. At this point, the P3P model simply assumes the transaction will fail.
But to the extent that individuals need or want the goods or services and cannot obtain them elsewhere—to the extent, that is, that all vendors serving a
given market believe collecting consumer data is a competitive necessity—
one suspects that individuals may simply concede, and convince themselves
that the loss of privacy associated with this particular transaction is not too
great.
The present valuation placed on any given surrender of personallyidentified information is, of course, also a matter of personal choice. Yet it is
difficult to assess the future significance of a loss of privacy, much less to
compare that future harm with a currently offered benefit. In part, this is due
to the information problems discussed above. In part, though, the disability
is cognitive. Estimating probability-weighted future value and discounting
for present value are hard, and people are demonstrably bad at it. 87 The
valuation problem is compounded by the fact that the trivial and incremental
character of each loss—information about a grocery purchase here, a magazine subscription there—tends to minimize its ultimate effect. 88 A comprehensive collection of data about an individual is vastly more than the sum of
its parts.

85. See, e.g., Clickrewards <http://www.clickrewards.com/>; Disney.com <http://www.
disney.go.com/>; FTD.com <http://www.ftd.com/>; Sony.com <http://www.sony.com/>; Travelcity.com <http://www.travelocity.com>; Varsitybooks.com <http://www.varsitybooks.com/>; 1800-flowers.com <http://www.1800flowers.com/>.
86. See BROMLEY , supra note 49, at 65-66; Cohen, supra note 44, at 518-33; Goldberg, supra
note 76, at 483-91 (discussing institutional advantages enjoyed by firms in setting standardized
contract terms); cf. Kenneth Lee & Gabriel Speyer, White Paper: Platform for Privacy Preferences
Project (P3P) & Citibank (1998) <http://www.w3.org/P3P/Lee_Speyer.html> (noting problems that
P3P-enforced variety of user preferences may pose for organization accustomed to standardized
practices).
87. For a good summary of the cognitive phenomena that distort assessment of risk in co mmercial transactions, see Larry T. Garvin, Adequate Assurance of Performance: Of Risk, Duress,
and Cognition, 69 U. COLO. L. REV . 71, 140-70 (1998).
88. Cf. Froomkin, supra note 3, at 492 (“[A]s long as in each individual transaction the cost of
not providing the information is disproportionate to the loss (which is a function of the cumulation
of the transactions, not any single transaction) a property rights approach appears unlikely to have
much real influence on database creation.”).
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More fundamentally, the privacy-as-choice model assumes that data privacy can be valued using market measures. But monetary measures of value
do not capture the very real incommensurabilities that the choice presents.
Privacy, like other dignity-related goods, has inherently nonmonetizable dimensions.89 These dimensions may be lost or distorted beyond recognition
in the translation to dollars and cents.
A final set of objections to the privacy-as-choice model is based on distributive justice concerns. Self-evidently, an important determinant of choice
within markets is wealth. If data privacy costs money—or, conversely, if
surrendering privacy saves money—access to privacy will be more unequal
than if it did not. Under a regime of tradable privacy rights, “privacy” simply will become a status that can be chosen (and paid for) the way one might
choose a neighborhood, a health club, or a brand of automobile.
Of course, it isn’t quite that simple—marketers would rather have your
data if you’re rich than if you’re poor. Thus, marketers are likely to spend
extra money to identify wealthier customers and recruit them to loyalty programs that offer incentives for repeat shoppers. 90 A perverse consequence of
a purely market-based approach to data privacy rights, then, may be more
discounts for the rich. If so, then the poor will lose twice over. They will
have less privacy, and they will also pay more for goods and services than
more desirable customers. Privacy in markets, then, is more than a luxury.
Personally-identified data is the wedge that enables “scientific,” marketdriven, and increasingly precise separation of “haves” from “have-nots.”91
Relatedly, the privacy-as-choice model ignores that some (perhaps most)
uses of personally-identified data do not involve offers of discounts. Consumer data can be used for many purposes to which consumers might not so
blithely agree: employment decisions and classifications by health insurance
providers that exclude or disadvantage genetic or medical “have-nots”; employment or housing decisions based on perceived personality risks; employment or housing decisions based on sexual or religious preferences; and
so on.92 Data processors have no particular interest in disclosing these uses,
precisely because individuals are likely to find them so objectionable. And
even many privileged individuals might not wish to trade their own privacy

89. See MARGARET JANE RADIN , CONTESTED COMMODITIES 74-94 (1996).
90. See, e.g., Pamela Klein, Malls Market Customer Base, CHI. TRIB ., Nov. 11, 1998, sec. 3,
at 1 (discussing the willingness of credit card companies like Visa USA to pay large sums of money
to talk to shoppers in malls); John Schwartz, The Price We Pay: When Everything’s up for Grabs,
True Value Is Hard to Find, W ASH . P OST , June 27, 1999, at B1 (describing how Home Depot identifies wealthy customers based on demographics and zip code and sends those customers coupons
directly by mail).
91. See OSCAR H. GANDY , JR., T HE P ANOPTIC SORT : A P OLITICAL ECONOMY OF P ERSONAL
I NFORMATION 53-94 (1993).
92. See Schwartz, supra note 84, at 25-41; GANDY , supra note 91, at 75-76.
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for the supposed advantages that privilege would confer; who knows, after
all, to what uses seemingly innocuous information might be put in the future?
To a substantial degree, then, the rhetoric of “choice” obfuscates the political choice that current data privacy policy represents. The data privacy
debate is not merely, or even mostly, about the satisfaction of consumer
preferences as expressed in the direct market for goods and services. Like
the rhetoric of “transaction costs,” the emphasis on “choice” conceals the
degree to which the model predetermines who chooses.93 In particular, with
respect to secondary uses of personally-identified data, the “choice” that the
model protects is not choice by individuals. It is the choice of data processors about how to classify individuals, and for what purposes.
To object that these structural inequalities—the reactive nature of consumer freedom, income disparities, and the like—are beyond the scope of the
problem is to miss the point. In any serious discussion of what constitutes
choice about privacy, perceived failures of markets are precisely the issue.
The design of markets, and whether to delegate resolution of particular questions to them, are themselves choices.94
The elusiveness of this point within the mainstream data privacy debate
suggests that, like “property,” “choice” has become a category with a specific, culturally determined meaning. “Freedom of choice” means “choice in
markets,” and means only that. In a provocative essay on the evolution of
governance structures, Larry Lessig observes that we have lost faith in other,
more traditional institutions of governance. 95 But it seems to me that the
phenomenon is cognitive as much as existential: We conceive of “freedom”
in literal, almost physical terms, as a function of direct or subjective constraints on behavior.96 Law, of course, does not directly constrain in most
instances; nor, I would argue, does it constrain more directly than price in
many cases. Yet law operates in terms of prohibition, while markets operate
in terms of possibility. And so liberty has come to mean freedom from laws
(other than economic ones) rather than freedom that laws might guarantee.
It was not always thus. As Eric Foner shows, liberty has meant many
things at different times in our history.97 At times, it has meant a simple,
93. See Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND . L. REV . 1609,
1660-62 (1999) (characterizing this aspect of the privacy-as-choice model as the “autonomy” trap).
94. See Jean Braucher, Contract Versus Contractarianism: The Regulatory Role of Contract
Law, 47 W ASH . & LEE L. REV . 697 (1990); Cohen, supra note 44, at 549-55; Goldberg, supra note
76, at 468 n.15, 484-91; cf. BROMLEY , supra note 49, at 118-21, 134-43, 165-81 (demonstrating
that the efficient equilibrium point in an economic system depends on the initial choice of entitlement structure).
95. See Lawrence Lessig, Governance (1998) (draft 3.01) <http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/
works/lessig/cpsr.pdf>.
96. Cf. Lessig, supra note 72, at 677-80 (discussing the difference between subjective, or perceived, constraints and objective ones).
97. See ERIC FONER , T HE STORY OF AMERICAN FREEDOM (1998).
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literal “libertarianism”; at other times, though, it has meant the freedom to
strive toward shared moral or existential ideals.98 As I will argue in Part
VI.A, 99 data privacy protection furthers still another sort of liberty—that of
self-determination, expressed through the power to define oneself to the
world in the way one wishes. The conventional wisdom is that such affirmative liberty claims are weaker and less principled than negative liberty
claims.100 Yet assuming this is so, the affirmative formulation is easily reframed in the negative: Data privacy ensures liberty to preclude certain
types of probabilistic judgments about one’s inclinations, abilities, or shortcomings. And thus reframed, it is difficult to see why this sort of selfinterested choice is less deserving of protection.
Here, data privacy opponents object that limiting markets in personallyidentified data will affect the range of other choices available to consumers
within markets. The “attention economy,” we are told, demands personal
profiling as a survival tactic.101 Vendors that are unable to exploit consumer
profiles to target their products and services effectively will be forced, instead, to discontinue narrowly-targeted product offerings and/or charge
higher prices for continued offerings. The effects, we are told, will be especially stark where targeted advertising has traditionally supported free or
near-free content—e.g., in the news and broadcast industries.102 Yet all other
things being equal, a prohibition on individualized profiling (or on nonconsensual profiling) will not change the fact that businesses compete to provide
products and services that consumers prefer, and that digital networks and
search tools reduce the costs of niche competition.
The privacy-value tradeoff, moreover, rests on the same spurious technological determinism as the privacy-efficiency tradeoff discussed in Part
II.C. 103 Currently, technologies designed to measure consumer preferences
permit retrieval and matching of data with names and other identifying characteristics. Systems could be designed quite differently. They could, for
example, allow aggregate profiling of groups of consumers without generating personally-identified or identifiable data. 104 For that matter, the problem

98. See id. at xvii-xviii.
99. See text accompanying notes 188-206 infra.
100. See ISAIAH BERLIN, T WO CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY (1958); David P. Currie, Positive and
Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV . 864 (1986).
101. For a concise discussion of the “economics of attention,” see CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R.
VARIAN , INFORMATION RULES : A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE NETWORK ECONOMY 6-8 (1999); see
also id. at 33-37, 166.
102. See Rohan Samarajiva, Interactivity as Though Privacy Mattered, in T ECHNOLOGY AND
P RIVACY: T HE NEW LANDSCAPE, supra note 51, at 277 (summarizing this argument and trends
showing increasing frequency and granularity of profiling in media industries).
103. See text accompanying notes 51-61 supra.
104. Cf. Burkert, supra note 60, at 131-33 (discussing this option but noting the need for sensitivity to potential risks posed by group profiles).
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of targeting information to consumers need not be solved by giving businesses more information about consumers; it could, instead, be solved by
giving consumers more information about businesses. Rather than giving
one entity rights to “shoes.com,” for example, we might design the Internet
domain name system to include directory pages for common words. 105
To be sure, the argument that limiting personal profiling will force market tradeoffs is not frivolous. At the margin, some businesses will suffer,
and some may go under (though others may thrive). The point is that the
mere fact of a tradeoff with some (unquantifiable) impact on choice in markets dictates the outcome of the data privacy debate only if there is only one
way to provide businesses with marketing information, and only if choice in
markets is the touchstone. Neither assumption is warranted. Our options are
more numerous, and more complicated, than market-tradeoffs reasoning
suggests.
*

*

*

*

Like “property,” “freedom of choice” cannot function as a solving idea
for the data privacy problem. The rhetoric of choice obscures the reality that
we face not one decision (freedom or not), but a bewildering constellation of
decisions about which choices to privilege, which to facilitate, and which to
restrict. We confront, as well, a bewildering array of legal, informational,
and technological tools that might be used to shape choices, or to set parameters for them. 106 A neutral conception of “freedom of choice” will not
help us; there simply is no neutral way of deciding how to choose.
The easy response to this dilemma is no response. Yet as Larry Lessig
so persuasively demonstrates, “doing nothing” and allowing market processes to dictate policy outcomes is itself a collective choice. 107 Taking freedom seriously requires more—or at least more honesty about why a
particular context or field of choice is preferred over others. We may decide
that market measures of choice are superior to other measures (for example,
political ones).108 Or we may decide that decentralized market processes are
superior to conscious attempts at social engineering. 109 But we—as a soc i105. Registration of generic domain names has become a multi-million-dollar business, and
allows exclusive ownership of easily-remembered search terms. See Ira S. Nathenson, Showdown
at the Domain Name Corral: Property Rights and Personal Jurisdiction Over Squatters, Poachers,
and Other Parasites, 58 U. P ITT. L. REV . 911, 956-57 (1997); Net Names Glitter for Entrepreneurs,
CNET NEWS , Dec. 28, 1999 <http://www.news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-1507943.html>.
106. See LESSIG, supra note 36, at 85-99; see also Lessig, supra note 71.
107. See LESSIG, supra note 36, at 218-21.
108. This might, but need not, reflect a belief that distributing privacy based on income is fair.
Instead, we might simply conclude that politically-determined criteria for privacy policy are likely
to be worse.
109. See David G. Post & David R. Johnson, “Chaos Prevailing on Every Continent”: Towards a New Theory of Decentralized Decision-Making in Complex Systems, 73 CHI.-KENT L.
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ety—should decide, and we should acknowledge our reasons. And since
choices about parameters are also, inevitably, choices about substance, we
also should consider the substantive purposes and values that profiling is said
to serve.
IV. KNOWING
The data privacy debate is, third, a debate about the substantive value of
personally-identified information. What do data processors in particular, and
society in general, gain from the ready availability of this information? One
view, broadly shared among participants on all sides of the debate and advanced with particular force by those concerned with access to data for research purposes, is that the collection and processing of personal data creates
knowledge. In addition, because our society places important values on
“sunlight,” withholding or concealing personal data has moral overtones. 110
Finally, data privacy opponents argue that marketers armed with more ni formation will serve consumer preferences more accurately, using means that
are less intrusive than current marketing practices.
If any of these arguments is right, then strong data privacy protection
seems singularly ill-advised—bad policy at best, and pernicious at worst.
Yet the underlying questions that data processing seeks to answer—who
people are, and what they want—are far more complicated than the know ledge justification makes them seem. This Part seeks to delineate the sorts of
“knowledge” that ready access to personally-identified data furthers, and to
understand the alternatives.
A. Theories of Knowledge
The rush to capture ever-greater amounts of personally-identified information is premised on the assumption that this information will yield the
ability to understand, and ultimately predict, individual behavior. Information, on this view, is simply the key to a preexisting reality that is determined
and discoverable. For the most part, even advocates of strong data privacy
have not questioned this central premise of the data processing industry.111
Yet research in economics, psychology, and information theory suggests that
REV . 1055 (1998); David R. Johnson, Let’s Let the Net Self-Regulate: The Case for Allowing Decentralized, Emergent Self-Ordering to Solve the “Public Policy” Problems Created by the Internet
(Apr. 7, 2000) <http://www.cli.org/selford/essay.htm>; David R. Johnson & David G. Post, And
How Shall the Net Be Governed?: A Meditation on the Relative Virtues of Decentralized, Emergent
Law (Apr. 7, 2000) <http://www.cli.org/emdraft.html>.
110. See Kreimer, supra note 9, at 91-92, 99-102.
111. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 84, at 25-31 (contesting the accuracy of conclusions
drawn from genetic testing, but on the more limited grounds that current genetic knowledge is incomplete and that data processors will use data irrationally).
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the relationship between data and behavior is much more complicated. Before making decisions about the contours of data privacy policy, it is worth
probing more closely into what we think personal data tell us about human
nature and predilection, and why we think this.
Within the legal academy, and within the larger data privacy debate, discussion of the value and social significance of personally-identified data is
increasingly framed in economic terms. Neoclassical law and economics
theory casts information asymmetry as inefficient because it precludes fully
informed trades.112 This view recognizes limited exceptions when secrecy is
desirable to induce productive activity—for example, trade secrecy to induce
research and development. 113 The individual desire to withhold personal
data does not fall into this category, however. Individuals who withhold personal data are simply seeking to deceive their trading partners—or, more
neutrally, to appropriate a greater share of the gains from trade than they otherwise would receive if their trading partners knew the “truth.”114 On this
view, therefore, the default rule should be one of disclosure, and the burden
falls on data privacy advocates to justify departures.
The standard legal-economic approach to personal information is firmly
rooted in liberal political theory and in associated principles of Enlightenment philosophy. If individuals must be free to promote their own happiness
by trading, and if individuals can best judge the happiness-enhancing effect
of particular trades with full information, then it follows that a regime of disclosure is best. Fully informed, in turn, means “possessed of all the information that one would want.” And (assuming one were rational) one would
want nothing less than to be scientific about identifying, collecting, systematizing, and digesting the relevant facts.115
To be sure, this legal-economic justification for disclosure is neither
monolithic nor universally accepted. First, some economically trained critics
charge that it improperly discounts individual preferences for privacy.116
Individuals who withhold personal data will not always be seeking to deceive
trading partners, but rather (or at least sometimes) to promote their own happiness. To the extent that the knowledge justification discounts this sort of
preference, it is both inaccurate and inappropriately paternalistic.
Second, the model does not seriously consider that the insights gained
from data processing may be incomplete or otherwise inaccurate. As a re112. See Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA . L. REV . 393 (1978); George J. St igler, An Introduction to Privacy in Economics and Politics, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 623 (1980).
113. See Posner, supra note 112, at 404.
114. See id. at 399.
115. See BORGMANN , supra note 2, at 34-37.
116. See Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic Defense
of Privacy, 84 GEO . L.J. 2381, 2416 (1996) (arguing that the utility derived from privacy is a substantial economic benefit).
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sult, market participants may draw inaccurate conclusions about individual
reliability or risk. For example, as Paul Schwartz shows, imperfect understanding of the correlation between genetic markers and disease may lead to
poorly reasoned decisions about insurability, or even employability. 117 In
addition, cognitive theory tells us that preexisting biases color interpretation
of the insights gained from data processing.118
Inaccuracy and irrationality problems, however, do not seem to dictate
an obvious policy response. In both cases, one might conclude that some
degree of data privacy is the solution. But one might also conclude that the
solution is more information, or better algorithms, or greater accountability.
Indeed, this is precisely what the prevailing rationale for data collection
would tend to suggest. On this view, the distortions caused by inaccuracy
and irrationality are temporary and resolvable. The problem is not that we
live in a world with an abundance of personal data, but that we have not yet
learned how to understand what the data tell us. Much hinges on whether
this is so, or whether these problems are more intractable than they appear.
The more profound objection to the prevailing legal-economic approach
to information is that it conflates information with knowledge of (or truth
about) reality. Information theory, in contrast, recognizes that “information”
and “reality” are different (though related) things, and that “knowledge”
forms an imperfect and culturally contingent bridge between them.119
Knowledge in society is a function of “technique,” defined broadly as the
technical and cognitive tools used to process information.120 For information
to be translated into anything more meaningful than transient sensory input,
some heuristic is necessary. Yet the choice of frame—the choice of how to
think about how we know things—is a choice that has substantive consequences.

117. See Schwartz, supra note 84, at 25, 36.
118. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics
and Biases, 185 SC I. 1124, 1124 (1974) (showing that people rely on a limited number of heuristic
principles to reduce the complex task of assessing probabilities and predicting values to simple
judgmental operations, and that this sometimes leads to severe and systematic errors); see also
Schwartz, supra note 84, at 25-31.
119. See ALBERT BORGMANN , HOLDING ONTO REALITY: T HE NATURE OF INFORMATION AT
THE T URN OF THE MILLENNIUM (1999); BRUNO L ATOUR, W E HAVE NEVER BEEN MODERN (Cat herine Porter trans., 1993); FRANK W EBSTER, T HEORIES OF THE I NFORMATION SOCIETY (1995); cf.
T HOMAS S. KUHN , T HE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970) (arguing that our
perceptions of scientific “facts” are shaped by the paradigms that we employ to make sense of
them).
120. See BORGMANN , supra note 119; JACQUES ELLUL, THE T ECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY
(John Wilkinson trans., 1964); KUHN, supra note 119; DONALD MAC KENZIE, KNOWING MA CHINES : ESSAYS ON T ECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE (1997); L ANGDON W INNER , AUTONOMOUS T ECH NOLOGY : T ECHNICS - OUT - OF -CONTROL AS A T HEME IN P OLITICAL T HOUGHT (1977); see also
LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 16.
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In our society, the prevailing approach to questions of technique is rationalizing. Knowledge of the world is attained by measuring, metering, and
predicting. Information theorists recognize, however, that rationalizing techniques may incorporate and reproduce systematic irrationalities. Information
systems and technologies are designed, not given, and the design process for
any technology or system for organizing information necessarily incorporates assumptions about the things or conditions that should be measured,
and the relevant quanta of measurement. 121
The data processing industry reflects and reproduces this rationalizing
framework. 122 Data processing practices are predicated on a belief that individuals are reducible to the sum of their transactions, genetic markers, and
other measurable attributes, and that these attributes are good predictors of
risk and reward in future dealings. Plainly, this belief is not entirely wrong;
there is much about individual behavior that is predictable on this basis. Yet
there also is much about individual behavior that is not. Some relevant information is inherently incapable of measurement or prediction. Human
motivation is internal, partly emotional, and often adventitious. The question
is whether systematically ignoring this dimension of human behavior, and
human potential, produces policy consequences that we would rather avoid.
B. Knowledge, Persuasion, and Power
There are two immediate arguments that the limitations inherent in the
data processing paradigm do not matter much. First, some predictability is
necessary for individuals, businesses, and governments to function. Second,
and relatedly, it may simply be that the question whether personallyidentified information is knowledge reduces to an argument about social attitudes toward predictability and its risks. There is a sense in which unpredictability strains our tolerance; we need to see the “hard facts”—including,
perhaps, the information gained from data processing—as certain, or at least
certain enough.123 And if that is all, then perhaps there is no problem here;
reliance need not equal blind faith.
One might object, further, that problematizing the knowledge gained
from data processing does not yield a particularly compelling argument for
data privacy as opposed to any other regime. If there is no “truth,” then why
121. See BORGMANN , supra note 119; ELLUL, supra note 120; GANDY , supra note 91, at 1552; MAC KENZIE, supra note 120; W INNER , supra note 120.
122. See GANDY , supra note 91, at 53-94. Paul Schwarz’s discussion of “genetic determinism” in the use of personal health care information approaches this conclusion. See Schwartz, supra note 84, at 26-29.
123. This parallels the preference for the relatively bounded, deterministic language of property rights over the relatively fuzzy, open-ended language of “dignity rights.” See notes 10-16 supra and accompanying text. But see BORGMANN , supra note 2, at 20-47 (arguing that the perceived
need to control and predict is culturally determined).
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does it matter what information others collect about us? Or, to be slightly
less nihilistic, if there is no “truth,” then why not let people choose for themselves whether to provide information to others?124 On this view, the indeterminacy of knowledge is a ho-hum affair; it provides neither sufficient
justification for nor sufficient objection to trade in personally-identified
data. 125
The indeterminate relation between information and “truth,” however, is
only half the story. The relationship between information and reality is dialectical: Reality eludes information and information-processing technique,
but at the same time information and technique shape behavior.126 Put differently, there is a real and substantial difference between denying there is a
single, objectively knowable reality and denying that there is an experienced
reality, or that the use of information to shape that reality matters. To reason
from the constructedness of reality to its absence (or unimportance) is to negate human agency. The fact that identity (as a function of preferences) is
malleable does not mean that identity is irrelevant.
Thus, the data privacy debate is not only about whether prediction is
possible, or about how much predictability we require, but also (with apologies to Marx) about who controls the modes of prediction—in other words,
about power over knowledge. 127 It follows that mechanisms for accountability (a watchword for data privacy advocates) should concern at least this
much.128 If categorization determines eligibility for rewards or opportunities,
then we may have an interest in the algorithms used to categorize. More

124. This conclusion aligns with the observation that postmodern information theory is entirely compatible with the late-stage informational capitalism that it purports to criticize. See
W EBSTER , supra note 119, at 190-91 (discussing theories by Fredric Jameson, David Harvey, and
Daniel Bell that interpret post-modernism as a product of capitalism).
125. It is worth noting, too, that although the corpus of personally-identified information now
residing in corporate and government databanks may mean less than we would like to believe, some
information is still true, and the collection of some truthful information is still important. Individuals, both as consumers and citizens, have an interest in the accurate collection of some data about
themselves and others. As Part VI.B discusses, a wise data privacy policy should attempt to ide ntify the circumstances in which that interest should outweigh others. See notes 207-221 infra and
accompanying text.
126. See BORGMANN , supra note 119; ELLUL, supra note 120; MAC KENZIE, supra note 120.
127. See, e.g., MICHEL FOUCAULT , DISCIPLINE AND P UNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON
(Alan Sheridan ed. & trans., 1977); MICHEL FOUCAULT , POWER /KNOWLEDGE (Colin Gordon ed. &
trans., 1980). Historians of technology dispute whether Marx understood technology simply as an
object of the struggle to control production, or as a critical constituent of production relations. See
MAC KENZIE, supra note 120, at 36-47 (describing the debate and taking the latter view). The
postmodernists, in turn, have been criticized for devoting insufficient attention to the relationships
between information, technology, and economic power. See W EBSTER , supra note 119, at 190-91.
128. Cf. Victoria Bellotti, Design for Privacy in Multimedia Computing and Communications
Environments, in T ECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY : T HE NEW LANDSCAPE , supra note 51, at 63 (arguing that the design of information systems should take into account the values of those whose actions are to be recorded).
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fundamentally, if preferences are subject to shaping and reshaping over time,
then we may have an interest in the sorts of shaping that are permitted.
Data privacy opponents argue that more fine-grained profiling will
eliminate the inaccuracies that lead to manipulation, by achieving a precise
correspondence between product offerings and individual wants.129 Yet
surely that is far too simple. The goal of any advertising is to get people to
buy—to create demand for what vendors want to sell. Targeted advertising
may be more successful, but it doesn’t necessarily follow that such advertis ing simply divines and reflects preexisting desires.130 It is well-understood
that the attractiveness of choices depends on how they are framed. 131 A more
tailored frame is not necessarily less manipulative; it may be more so.
Again, though, the exclusive focus on purchaser choice is disingenuous.
As noted above, many uses of personally-identified data occur outside the
realm of direct-to-consumer marketing. And even the point of targeted advertising is not merely to enable choice by the target market, but also to effectuate choice by the advertiser. Better profiling enables discrimination in
the broad sense, on any ground deemed reasonable, desirable, and not illegal. 132 And even “benign” discrimination—say, a decision to market only to
those subsets of consumers who are statistically more likely to buy—operates to categorize at least some individuals on a basis other than the one they
would wish. 133
Here, as with transaction costs and choice, we confront an allocational
inequality. The knowledge justification for personal profiling treats irratio nality by information-seekers and information-withholders differently. Data
processors are free to behave irrationally (though it is presumed that they
ordinarily won’t); data subjects may not. Or, more precisely, data subjects
may behave as they please, but will be judged against standards of rationality
not of their own choosing. The view of human nature reinforced by dataprocessing algorithms is both unforgiving and ungenerous. There is little
room, or tolerance, for randomness, idiosyncrasy, or mistake, and little allowance for learning effects and second chances. The data processing par a129. See, e.g., The Direct Marketing Association, DMA Interactive <http://www.the-dma.
org/>; Teleconnect, Inc., Teleconnect <http://www.teleconnect.com/>. For a more theoretical discussion of profiling, see Hal R. Varian, Economic Aspects of Personal Privacy (December 6, 1996)
<http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/~hal/Papers/privacy/> (explaining economic rationale for profiling).
130. See Kirsten M. Lagatree, Where You Live Gives Marketers Clues to Buying Habits, L.A.
T IMES , Dec. 15, 1996, at K3 (describing examples of targeted advertising); cf. Dinh, supra note 50,
at 2130 (arguing that advertising seeks to create relative preferences, and that these preferences are
socially inefficient).
131. See generally Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 118; Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. BUS . S251 (1986) (describing common
rules of framing and their effects on choice).
132. Prohibitions on racial profiling represent an implicit societal decision that not every use
of “rational”/statistical knowledge should be permitted. See text accompanying note 178 infra.
133. See GANDY , supra note 91, at 80-87.
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digm holds individuals rigidly accountable for their past experiences—even
as it seeks to coopt agency prospectively.
Sometimes, categorization of individuals may be fair; sometimes, too, it
will be inevitable, or we will conclude that the risks of attempting to prohibit
it are too great. But the content of the categories, and the fairness of reliance
on category-driven sorting as a means of allocating economic opportunity,
are proper subjects for collective debate. It is at least worth discussing
whether this approach is desirable, and considering the alternatives.
*

*

*

*

The data processing paradigm conceals a power relationship, and that
relationship, in turn, is a crucial determinant of the truth that data processing
constructs. In evaluating knowledge claims about the processing of personally-identified data, we are not simply concerned with predictability and risk
tolerance, but more fundamentally with questions of behavior modification
and free will. Profiling represents not only a particular theory of knowing,
but also a disturbing, deeply cynical opportunism about the use of persuasion
to reshape individual and collective knowledge. If data reveals truth, it is
possible to attain omniscience. If data constructs truth, it is possible to attain
power. We have a vested interest in the content of the “truth” under construction. It follows that data privacy policy should be concerned with
modes of knowing; a wise data privacy policy cannot do otherwise. Yet we
also must consider, finally, whether constitutional protection for freedom of
expression prevents this inquiry. To that question I now turn.
V. SPEAKING
A final answer to the problem of knowledge, and a fourth perspective on
the data privacy question, is that the difference between “knowledge” and
“information” is irrelevant to resolving the data privacy debate. Instead, the
data privacy debate is a debate about freedom of speech and its limits. On
this view, the problem with strong data privacy protection is not that it would
protect data subjects against erroneous judgments of their worth or limiting
representations of reality. In our society, one may not spread deliberate
falsehood (at least not without fear of a libel suit), but one is under no obligation to seek “truth” in some absolute sense. Instead, the problem with data
privacy protection is that it would interfere with the speech rights of wouldbe data-collectors to spread any judgments, generalizations, and correlations
that are salable and not demonstrably false.
Of all the categorical double-binds that the data privacy debate creates,
the opposition of privacy and speech is by far the most difficult. Speech
freedoms are central in our culture, and their vigilant protection has served us
well. Yet of all the perceived privacy conflicts, this one most requires explo-
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ration, and for precisely the same reason that it is hard: An expansive approach to the liberties of data processors threatens constitutional foreclosure
of the data privacy debate. We must consider, then, whether the data privacy
debate really forces us to choose between privacy and speech.
A. Theories of (Commercial?) Speech
The First Amendment argument against data privacy protection begins
by assuming that the collection, processing, and exchange of personallyidentified data are “speech,” and then asserts that regulation of these activities cannot survive the requisite scrutiny.134 Both steps bear closer scrutiny.
As applied to data privacy regulation, the standard balancing analysis has
been categorical, driven by outcome-determining presuppositions about the
expressive content and ownership status of personally-identified information.
Closer attention to the competing interests that data privacy regulation seeks
to balance might produce a different assessment of the constitutionality of
generally-applicable protective measures. More fundamentally, though,
there is reason to question whether the traditional modes of First Amendment
review should apply in the same way, or at all, to regulation of commercial
processing of personal information. Other approaches to theorizing about
speech, and about information more generally, suggest different ways of
thinking about the collection and exchange of personally-identified data and
the role of these activities within the broader commercial fabric of society.
As an initial matter, a First Amendment analysis of data privacy protection must consider how to characterize the sort of speech involved. Traditionally, the threshold for regulation of speech classed as “commercial” has
been lower than the threshold for regulation of other speech.135 Both some
advocates and some opponents of strong data privacy protection have assumed that the collection and exchange of personally-identified data by
commercial entities is most appropriately classified as commercial speech,
and the handful of courts that have addressed First Amendment challenges to
data privacy regulations have followed suit. 136
134. See, e.g., SINGLETON , supra note 51; Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Inform ation Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52
STAN . L. REV . 1049 (2000).
135. First Amendment protection for commercial speech is a relatively recent development.
See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561-63
(1980); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
758-70 (1976). Previously, the Court had held that commercial advertising, at least, was not ent itled to First Amendment protection at all. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942)
(“[T]he Constitution imposes no . . . restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising.”).
136. See U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224, 1232-33 (10th Cir. 1999); United Reporting
Publ’g Corp. v. California Highway Patrol, 146 F.3d 1133, 1136-37 (9th Cir. 1998), rev’d sub nom.
Los Angeles Police Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 120 S. Ct. 483 (1999).
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In fact, most regulation of commercial data-processing activities probably would not qualify as “commercial speech” regulation. The traditional
justification for greater regulation of commercial speech turns on the listener’s interest in receiving accurate information about market choices, and
holds that the government may suppress misleading or deceptive commercial
communications to protect this interest. 137 Although data privacy advocates
object that current law does not hold data processors accountable for the accuracy of personally-identified data, their concerns extend far beyond factual
accuracy. In addition, a focus on misleading or deceptive communications
suggests that “commercial speech” encompasses only communications between buyer and seller about terms, or about the qualities of the seller’s
goods or services. 138 Arguably, this definition does not encompass the actual
subject matter of the transaction—here, the data itself.139
That data privacy regulation burdens speech does not necessarily make it
unconstitutional. Instead, courts undertake a balancing inquiry. Regulation
of commercial speech must satisfy the four-part test articulated in Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York. 140
Under Central Hudson, if the regulation targets a communication that is not
misleading or related to unlawful activity, it must be supported by a substantial government interest, must materially advance that interest, and must not
be more restrictive than necessary to serve that interest. 141 A similar standard applies to content-neutral laws that burden speech only indirectly.142 In
137. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563-64; Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at
771 & n.24. At least four current Justices would classify as “commercial speech” only speech that
proposes a commercial transaction, and would apply intermediate scrutiny only where regulation of
such speech is designed to prevent fraud or deception. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island,
517 U.S. 484, 509-14 (1996) (plurality); id. at 518 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Alex Kozinski
& Stuart Banner, The Anti-History and Pre-History of Commercial Speech, 71 TEX . L. REV . 747
(1993) (discussing the early history of advertising and arguing that the early cases do not support
the notion of a general distinction between “commercial” and “noncommercial” speech); Alex
Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA . L. REV . 627 (1990) (arguing that a general distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech in untenable); ;
Martin H. Redish, First Amendment Theory and the Demise of the Commercial Speech Distinction:
The Case of the Smoking Controversy, 24 N. KY . L. REV. 553 (1997) (same); Martin H. Redish,
The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression,
39 GEO . W ASH . L. REV . 429 (1971) (same).
138. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562-63; Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761-62,
771-72.
139. Data privacy opponents argue that transactions in personally-identified data are analogous to reporting by the press, and therefore should receive the highest First Amendment protection. See SINGLETON, supra note 51, at 7. I shall argue, however, that the fact that the data is the
actual subject matter of the transaction argues for quite a different First Amendment standard of
review. See text accompanying notes 161-164 infra; see also text accompanying notes 207-214
infra (discussing, and rejecting, the “journalism” objection to data privacy regulation).
140. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
141. See id. at 564.
142. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (noting that incidental limit ations on First Amendment freedoms are permissible if they further a substantial government interest
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other speech cases, the government interest must be compelling and the
regulation narrowly tailored to advance the interest in the least restrictive
way.143
A pair of recent cases, however, suggest that courts may interpret these
tests in ways that pose insuperable difficulties for data privacy regulation. In
both cases, the analysis was categorical; both courts paid lip service to the
idea of balancing, but treated strong data privacy protection as definitionally
incompatible with constitutional speech regulation. Together, the two dec isions reveal an understanding of “speech”—derived from the germinal metaphor of a “marketplace of ideas,”144 but conceptually quite distinct from it—
as inextricably bound up with the exchange of informational property in
markets.
In U.S. West v. Federal Communications Commission, a Tenth Circuit
majority concluded that heightened informed consent requirements violated
Central Hudson’s fourth prong. 145 The dispute concerned an FCC regulation
requiring telephone companies to use opt-in rather than opt-out procedures
before using their customers’ personally-identified data to cross-sell other
services. A majority of the panel agreed with U.S. West that, given the
availability of less burdensome opt-out procedures, the opt-in regulation was
more restrictive than necessary to serve the asserted purpose of protecting
customer privacy. The court rejected the argument advanced by the FCC—
and endorsed by the dissenting judge—that opt-in procedures were the least
restrictive means likely to be effective in obtaining meaningful, informed
consent.146
The U.S. West decision nicely illustrates Peter Edelman’s observation
that judges balancing speech and privacy claims reveal themselves to be “absolutists in balancers’ clothing.”147 The ultimate question in U.S. West—the
relative burden of opt-in and opt-out restrictions governing a consent-based
regime for the reuse of personally-identified data—was narrow and factual.
Given the extensive record developed by the FCC regarding the likely ineffectiveness of opt-out procedures, the majority’s conclusion is difficult to

unrelated to the suppression of free expression and if the limitation is no greater “than is essential to
the furtherance of that interest”).
143. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992) (plurality); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S.
312, 321 (1988); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
144. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Kat hleen M. Sullivan, Free Speech and Unfree Markets, 42 UCLA L. REV . 949, 963-64 (1995); Kat hleen M. Sullivan, Discrimination, Distribution and Free Speech, 37 ARIZ . L. REV . 439, 445-46
(1995).
145. 182 F.3d 1224, 1238 (10th Cir. 1999).
146. See id. at 1238-39; id. at 1246-47 (Briscoe, J., dissenting).
147. Peter B. Edelman, Free Press v. Privacy: Haunted by the Ghost of Justice Black, 68
T EX . L. REV. 1195, 1223 (1990).
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justify.148 Central Hudson itself is clear that burden cannot be assessed in a
vacuum, but rather must be judged relative to likely efficacy. (By any standard, the dispute in U.S. West implicates core commercial speech concerns
about deception of consumers; even if it didn’t, though, the regulation seems
designed to survive even stricter scrutiny than Central Hudson requires.)
The U.S. West majority’s lack of interest in the record bespeaks prejudgment—not only about speech, but also about ownership, choice, and the
value of transactional information. The court presumed a world in which
data processors own their customers’ personally-identified information unless the customers say otherwise, and in which “choice” is assessed in the
abstract, without considering whether there is enough information to make
the choice a real one. And although it did not decide the question, it expressed skepticism that a broad, general interest in “privacy” could ever be
weighty enough to support greater restrictions on the flow of “true information.”149
Even an opposite resolution of the opt-in/opt-out problem, though,
doesn’t speak to the constitutionality of attempts to regulate secondary and
tertiary uses of information already in a data processor’s possession. Here, a
recent Ninth Circuit decision (later reversed on other grounds) demonstrates
that regulations restricting the use and exchange of personally-identified data
may face an equally tough hurdle in the third prong of the Central Hudson
test. United Reporting Publishing Corp. v. California Highway Patrol 150
involved a California statute authorizing release of arrestees’ addresses for
“scholarly, journalistic, political, or governmental” but not commercial purposes.151 A unanimous court found that in light of these provisions, the restriction on commercial access would not materially advance the asserted
interest of promoting the privacy of arrestees. 152 Therefore, the court concluded, the regulation was “directed at preventing solicitation practices”—in
other words, at suppressing protected speech directed at the eventual targets
of commercial profiling activities—and so invalid on its face. 153
148. I have signed an amicus brief urging en banc reconsideration on this and other grounds.
149. See U.S. West, 182 F.3d at 1234-35 & n.7 (quoting FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE
I NFORMATION AGE 28 (1997)).
150. 146 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1998), rev’d sub nom. Los Angeles Police Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 120 S. Ct. 483 (1999).
151. Id. at 1135 (quoting a 1996 amendment to CAL. GOV . CODE § 6254(f) (West 1995)).
152. See id. at 1138-40.
153. Id. at 1139 (citing Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 73 (1983)). At
oral argument in the Supreme Court, counsel for United Reporting characterized the statute’s differential treatment of commercial and journalistic uses as content-based discrimination. See Appellee’s Oral Argument at 32-34, Los Angeles Police Dept. v. United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 120 S.
Ct. 483 (1999) (No. 98-678) (available in 1999 WL 970765) . Although he did not argue that this
should trigger strict scrutiny, one presumes that the statute’s express distinction between broadly
“commercial” uses and other uses would be unacceptable to those Justices who urge a narrower
definition of commercial speech. See supra note 137.
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Again, though, the United Reporting court’s conclusions seem driven by
presuppositions about the nature and weight of data privacy claims rather
than by a careful balancing of the interests involved. The court conflated
information about individuals with communication to individuals, and thus
refused, definitionally, to recognize profiling as a separate and distinct harm
that the state might have an interest in seeking to prevent. As a result, it
dismissed as “no more than speculation and conjecture” the state’s argument
that the statute would help prevent commercial profiling from reaching crit ical mass.154 And the court’s analysis of the statutory exceptions as directed
at (a particular type of) direct-marketing communication rather than at protecting privacy erects a constitutional barrier to data privacy protection that is
effectively insurmountable. The statutory language strongly suggests that
the California Legislature attempted to strike a balance that would not
threaten the important First Amendment interest in promoting reporting and
comment on issues of public concern. For precisely that reason, one suspects
that more comprehensive usage restrictions—restrictions designed to promote privacy even more “materially”—would have failed prong four of the
Central Hudson analysis. In effect, then, the Ninth Circuit’s decision says
that government can’t protect data privacy at all. 155
In short, U.S. West and the circuit-level decision in United Reporting rest
on the same implicit, and rather curious, syllogistic reasoning about the irreconcilability of legal protection for data privacy and legal protection for
speech: Personally-identified data is (true) information; this information is
owned, presumptively, by those who collect it; the solicitation of consumers
is an expressive act; therefore, anything that burdens the collection, commercial use, and market exchange of personally-identified information impermissibly burdens speech. The effortless and wholly unremarked slippage
between images of information as speech and as (owned and traded) commodity is all the more remarkable because neither court (and, for that matter,
none of the parties) questioned the presence of “communication” at the collection, processing, and exchange stages—a threshold requirement either for
Central Hudson scrutiny or for the stricter scrutiny that a narrowed conception of commercial speech might require. In the sense that counts for First
Amendment purposes, personally-identified data is not collected, used or
sold for its expressive content at all; it is a tool for processing people, not a

154. United Reporting, 146 F.3d at 1139.
155. The Supreme Court’s reversal, on the ground that California was not required to give out
arrestee information in the first place, does not disturb this reasoning with respect to information
that government is required to disclose, nor with respect to regulation of purely private-sector information transactions. See Los Angeles Police Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g Corporate,. 120
S. Ct. 483, 489 (1999). Moreover, the Court carefully reserved judgment on an as-applied challenge that the Ninth Circuit had not considered. See id. at 488; id. at 490 (Scalia, J., concurring);
see also id. at 491-93 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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vehicle for injecting communication into the “marketplace of ideas.”156 Yet
this objection is definitionally incompatible with the view that the highest
and best First Amendment value of any information is realized through its
free-subject-to-the-rules-of-property exchange in markets. And so, finally,
our understanding of “speech” reinforces, and is reinforced by, the theory of
market-based self-actualization that undergirds our models of knowledge,
ownership, and choice.
Once again, though, other strands of theorizing about speech, and more
broadly about law and information policy, point in other directions. First and
most generally, some First Amendment scholars argue that speech markets
require a certain amount of economic regulation—in other words, that a
market-based understanding of speech justifies regulatory responses designed to correct market failures. 157 If we reconceptualized the government
interest in protecting data privacy as an interest in correcting information
asymmetries in the market for personally-identified data, the Central Hudson
analysis (or a more stringent review) might proceed quite differently. In
particular, an explicitly economic approach to regulation of speech markets
would save regulations like the opt-in rule challenged in U.S. West, which
focus on the quality as well as the fact of consent.
In addition, several scholars have advanced alternative approaches to the
more broadly defined problem of government regulation of speech by commercial speakers. Here, the works of C. Edwin Baker and Daniel Halberstam
are particularly important. Baker’s theory of speech rights as intended to
further individual liberty would accord minimal, if any, constitutional protection to commercial speakers that are not individuals.158 Halberstam, in
contrast, believes that commercial speech merits at least some First Amendment protection. He argues, however, that commercial speech, broadly defined, plays an important structural role in constituting commercial
institutions within society, and thus merits regulation to the extent necessary
to preserve institutional integrity. 159

156. Cf. Dan L Burk, Patenting Speech, 79 T EX . L. REV. (forthcoming 2000) (discussing the
dual nature of software as information and as an artifact embodying functionality). Robert Post
argues that the “communication” trigger for First Amendment scrutiny is itself an empty formalism.
See Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN . L. REV. 1249, 1251-60 (1995).
157. See C. EDWIN BAKER , ADVERTISING AND A DEMOCRATIC PRESS (1994); C. Edwin
Baker, Giving the Audience What It Wants, 58 OHIO ST . L.J. 311 (1997); Ashutosh Bhagwat, Of
Markets and Media: The First Amendment, the New Mass Media, and the Political Components of
Culture, 74 N.C. L. REV . 141 (1995).
158. See C. EDWIN BAKER , HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 194-224 (1989);
Randall P. Bezanson, Institutional Speech, 80 I OWA L. REV . 735, 735-36 (1995) (arguing that
speech without an identifiable individual author is ineligible for First Amendment protection).
159. See Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the Constitutional
Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. P A . L. REV . 771 (1999) (advocating a unified treatment of
commercial and professional speech); cf. Post, supra note 156 (arguing that First Amendment doc-
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Together, Baker’s and Halberstam’s analyses support an approach to
(commercial) speech regulation that emphasizes the structural and production functions of speech markets within society. 160 One need not subscribe to
Baker’s conclusion that corporate commercial speech is wholly unprotected
to endorse his more general point that promoting individual autonomy and
self-determination are central First Amendment concerns.161 On this view,
Congress might regulate commercial data-processing practices that seek to
reduce individuals to the objects of classification, sorting, and preferencemanipulation. Halberstam’s approach, meanwhile, suggests that Congress
also may regulate the collection and exchange of personally-identified data
to prevent the systemic, structural consequences of a growing imbalance of
informational power between vendors and consumers.
Finally, a market-institutional approach to speech regulation also counsels greater sensitivity to the dual role of information as “speech” and as
“product” or “property.” Recent work in both First Amendment theory and
intellectual property law raises provocative questions about how the law
should reconcile the rigorous scrutiny due restrictions on speech with the
much greater deference afforded regulation of property interests. For example, Spencer Overton suggests that because political contributions share important distributional characteristics with real property, courts should employ
a hybrid standard for review of campaign finance legislation. 162 Foundational work in law and information policy by James Boyle, Yochai Benkler,
Diane Zimmerman, and others explores the theoretical and logistical difficulties that the dual nature of information poses for rules concerning access
to and use of information goods. 163 Much work remains to be done in exploring and describing the interfaces between property and speech, both gentrine should consider the functions of speech within social institutions); Frederick Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112 HARV . L. REV . 84 (1998) (same).
160. The terminology is Neil Netanel’s. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 288 (1997). Netanel argues that copyright law, properly
understood, serves both to reinforce social institutions that prevent the entrenchment and abuse of
power and to foster reasoned deliberation about public affairs. He concludes that limiting the scope
of the rights accorded individual authors best promotes these goals. See id. at 364-85.
161. One need not even agree with Baker that the First Amendment exists primarily to pr omote individual self-determination. See OWEN M . FISS , LIBERALISM DIVIDED : FREEDOM OF
SPEECH AND THE MANY USES OF STATE POWER 5 (1996) (arguing that “the role of the First
Amendment is to preserve the fullness and openness of public debate”); CASS R. SUNSTEIN ,
DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993) (arguing that the First Amendment
should be interpreted with the interest in democratic self-governance in mind). Informational pr ivacy promotes collective self-determination as well. See text accompanying notes 188-206 infra.
162. See Spencer A. Overton, Mistaken Identity: Unveiling the Property Characteristics of
Political Money, 53 VAND . L. REV . (forthcoming 2000).
163. See JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS , SOFTWARE , AND SPLEENS : LAW AND THE CONSTRUC TION OF THE I NFORMATION SOCIETY (1996); Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use:
First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain , 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999);
Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Information as Speech, Information as Goods: Some Thoughts on
Marketplaces and the Bill of Rights, 33 W M . & MARY L. REV . 665 (1992).
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erally and in the particular case of personally-identified data. 164 It is clear,
however, that an approach to information policy that focuses only on information’s expressive characteristics (or only on its proprietary aspects) is increasingly untenable.
In sum, as with theories of ownership, theories of speech preclude strong
data privacy protection only to the extent that market exchange of informational property for value is considered the essence of the right that the First
Amendment protects. Other understandings of the relationship between
speech and speech markets, and more generally between information as
speech and information as property or commodity, might produce different
conclusions about the sorts of data privacy regulation that the First Amendment allows. I turn, therefore, to consideration of whether and how these
understandings should matter.
B. Speech, Property, and Market Institutions
As a society, we regulate the exchange of information as property all the
time, and do so based on market-institutional considerations. In addition, the
law routinely allows private parties to invoke property or contract rights to
restrict others’ speech. If collections of personally-identified data are like
other sorts of regulated information, or if individuals have property or contractual interests that extend to (at least some) personally-identified information on an ongoing basis, the First Amendment landscape changes. The data
privacy debate is not merely a debate about trading speech for privacy, although it is still that. Defining the contours of acceptable data privacy regulation becomes a problem of drawing boundaries between competing
constitutional considerations—a problem, that is, of making wise constit utional policy.
The law affords numerous instances of regulation of the exchange of information as property or product. Securities markets, which operate entirely
by means of information exchange, are subject to extensive regulation, and
hardly anybody thinks that securities laws and regulations should be subjected to heightened or strict First Amendment scrutiny.165 Laws prohibiting
patent, copyright, and trademark infringement, and forbidding the misappropriation of trade secrets, have as their fundamental purpose (and their undis-

164. Much current scholarship focuses on the use of “property” formalism to override speech
concerns. As I discuss, personally-identified data raises the opposite problem. See text accompanying notes 170-176 infra.
165. See Frederick Schauer, The Aim and the Target in Free Speech Methodology, 83 NW . U.
L. REV . 562, 562-63 (1989); see also BOYLE, supra note 163, at 81-96. But see Burt Neuborne, The
First Amendment and Government Regulation of Capital Markets, 55 BROOK . L. REV . 5 (1989);
Nicholas Wolfson, The First Amendment and the SEC, 20 CONN . L. REV. 265 (1988); Aleta G.
Estreicher, Securities Regulation and the First Amendment, 24 GA . L. REV . 223 (1990).
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puted effect) the restriction of information flows.166 The securities and intellectual property laws, moreover, are expressly content-based, and thus illustrate that (as several leading First Amendment scholars acknowledge) this
characterization doesn’t always matter. 167 Finally, federal computer crime
laws punish certain uses of information for reasons entirely unrelated to their
communicative aspects.168
In each of these examples, regulation of information markets is based on
institutional concerns. The securities laws are designed to ensure that securities markets function as fair and efficient mechanisms for allocating capital
and distributing investment risk. The intellectual property laws perform
analogous functions for markets in creative capital. Patent and copyright law
are expressly designed to foster innovation and to provide a framework for
exploiting the economic value of inventive and creative products. Trademark and trade secret law, respectively, constrain unfair and deceptive misappropriation of reputational and innovative goodwill. Federal criminal
prohibitions on the theft or misuse of information, meanwhile, protect the
institution of private property, and sometimes other institutions as well. 169
A similar analysis applies to laws regulating the collection, processing,
and exchange of personally-identified data. As I have already noted, for
each of these activities, the data itself is distinct from the speech that proposes and defines the transaction. 170 That doesn’t necessarily mean, though,
that the higher level of scrutiny reserved for noncommercial speech regulation should apply. It might mean, instead, that a lesser level of scrutiny is
warranted, or that we need not apply First Amendment standards of review at
all. The data is itself the subject matter of the transaction—the “goods” exchanged. And, as distinct from news or literature, or from reports of scientific research exchanged among colleagues, it isn’t purchased to be “read.”
Rather, it is purchased to serve a fundamentally different sort of function—
that of categorizing and segmenting a customer base. 171

166. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125 (1994) (trademark); 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994 & Supp. IV
1998) (copyright); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1832 (Supp. IV 1998) (trade secret); 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1994
& Supp. IV 1997) (patent).
167. See Post, supra note 156, at 1265-70; Schauer, supra note 165, at 567 (“Thus, if we look
beyond the class of cases that have ‘[F]irst [A]mendment’ written all over them, we see everywhere
both the inevitability and constitutionality of government regulation inspired precisely by the communicative impact of the regulated conduct.”); cf. Clay Calvert, Free Speech and ContentNeutrality: Inconsistent Applications of an Increasingly Malleable Doctrine, 29 MC GEORGE L.
REV . 69 (1997) (noting incoherence of the distinction even within “core” First Amendment cases).
168. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030, 2701 (1994).
169. Cf. Post, supra note 156, at 1252 (considering First Amendment implications of laws
criminalizing conduct that communicates); Schauer, supra note 165, at 566-67 (same).
170. See text accompanying notes 138-139 supra.
171. Cf. Federal Election Comm’n v. Legi-Tech, Inc., 967 F. Supp. 523, 530-31 (D.D.C.
1997) (sustaining a Federal Election Commission order barring commercial resale of political con-
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The accumulation, use, and market exchange of personally-identified
data don’t fit neatly into any recognized category of “commercial speech,” in
other words, because in the ways that matter, these activities aren’t really
“speech” at all. Although regulation directed at these acts may impose some
indirect burden on direct-to-consumer communication, that isn’t the primary
objective of data privacy regulation. This suggests that, at most, data privacy
regulation should be subject to the intermediate scrutiny applied to indirect
speech regulation. 172 And the example of intellectual property, in particular,
further suggests that if data privacy regulation incorporates sufficient structural protection for speech-related concerns (on which see Part VI.B., below), then—just as in garden-variety infringement cases—in many cases
there will be no need for heightened scrutiny at all. 173
From an institutional perspective, the unrestricted exchange of personally-identified data vitiates the expected boundaries of commercial interaction. Roughly speaking, we might define those boundaries to include each
transaction or series of transactions with a particular type of merchant. As
currently constructed, networked databases of personally-identified information do not recognize institutional boundaries or field-of-use restrictions.
Data exchange within and across the many different markets experienced by
tribution information). But see Federal Election Comm’n v. Political Contributions Data, Inc., 943
F.2d 190, 196-98 (2d Cir. 1991) (construing “commercial use” prohibition narrowly).
172. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (articulating the intermediate scrutiny
standard that applies to indirect burdens on speech).
173. Cf. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 555-60 (1985)
(holding that copyright doctrines such as the fair use doctrine and the idea-expression distinction
accommodate First Amendment concerns); New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971
F.2d 302, 307 (9th Cir. 1992) (defining class of “non-trademark use[s] of a mark” that safeguards
First Amendment concerns). There is currently considerable dispute as to the precise location of
structural First Amendment safeguards within existing copyright and trademark doctrine. See, e.g.,
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings at 31-52, Eldred v.
Reno, No. CA99-0065JLG, 31-52 (D.D.C. Oct. 28, 1999) <http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/
eldredvreno/sj_memo.pdf>; Benkler, supra note 163; Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help , 13 BERKELEY T ECH. L.J. 1089, 1133-34 (1998) [hereinafter Cohen, Self-Help];
Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at “Copyright Management” in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV . 981 (1996) [hereinafter Cohen, Right to Read Anonymously]; Rochelle
Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65
NOTRE DAME L. REV . 397 (1990); Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and
Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147 (1998); Netanel, supra note 160;
Malla Pollack, The Right to Know?: Delimiting Database Protection at the Juncture of the Co mmerce Clause, the Intellectual Property Clause, and the First Amendment, 17 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT . L.J. 47 (1999); Zimmerman, supra note 163; see also Burk, supra note 156 (predicting similar
dispute within patent law as a consequence of Ninth Circuit decision that computer software in
object code form qualifies as protected speech). Almost nobody, however, argues that First
Amendment principles require heightened scrutiny as to every aspect of every copyright or trademark dispute. But see Lemley & Volokh, supra, at 183-86 (arguing that because copyright protection is content-based, First Amendment doctrine about prior restraints should govern in disputes
about injunctive relief); Eugene Volokh & Brett McDonnell, Freedom of Speech and Independent
Judgment Review in Copyright Cases, 107 YALE L.J. 2431 (1998) (arguing that the First Amendment requires de novo review of infringement judgments).
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individuals is relatively seamless and will become more so. The bounded
speech institutions of commerce described by Halberstam are becoming, instead, the total institution—a commercial panopticon whose goal is the precisely calibrated extraction of consumer surplus.174
It may be objected that an institutional theory of commercial speech
regulation would not tell us what should happen when pressures for change
come from within the institution of commercial interaction itself. Halberstam’s preliminary and general statement that regulation should seek to preserve expectation, or “social practice” with respect to a “predefined
communicative project” might counsel restraint in times of institutional
change. 175 The conclusion that the government may never regulate changing
institutions, though, leads swiftly (and unsurprisingly) to the conclusion that
the government may not seek to regulate social institutions at all. It also
begs the question whether particular institutional changes reflect the consensus of all involved parties, or only some. 176 If the latter, then a decision that
the First Amendment prohibits the regulation is, inevitably, also a decision
about whose interests to privilege—exactly the sort of entrenchment that the
First Amendment is supposed to prevent.177
The point here is not that the First Amendment imposes no constraints
whatsoever on regulation of the collection, use, and exchange of personallyidentified data, or that regulation of information exchange does not raise serious, legitimate concerns about the exercise of government power to shape
social practice. The point is that these are difficult questions that can’t be
answered by rote incantation of the proposition that information exchange is
speech. It just isn’t that simple. Sometimes, speech concerns cannot so eas ily be disentangled from concerns about commercial practices in markets,
and sometimes regulation of information practices within markets really is
about commercial fair play.
Let me be quite clear, too, that I do not mean to suggest more generally
that the market-exchange value of information is undeserving of constitutional protection. Markets for speech are a vital and indispensable alternative to government production of speech, and an equally indispensable
corrective to government abuse and excess. Moreover, a degree of agnosticism about the sorts of speech that facilitate self-determination is essential in
174. See generally GANDY , supra note 91, at 53-94 (characterizing the goal of the data processing industry as seamless panoptic categorization and sorting of individuals); Froomkin, supra
note 3, at 482-91 (describing the practice of “data mining” based on interlinked digital databases).
175. Halberstam, supra note 159, at 831-33.
176. Cf. Cohen, Right to Read Anonymously, supra note 173, at 994-1003 (taking a skeptical
view of the argument that disputes about Internet governance can be resolved using the same informal, norm-based mechanisms that are so effective in small, homogeneous communities); Mark A.
Lemley, The Law and Economics of Internet Norms, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV . 1257 (1998) (same).
177. Cf. Overton, supra note 162 (arguing that a campaign finance jurisprudence that equates
money with speech disserves First Amendment values).
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a diverse and pluralistic society. There is a vast difference, though, between
saying that markets in information play an important role in creating and
sustaining a thriving marketplace of ideas and saying that the two sorts of
markets are one and the same, or that every information market plays this
role to the same extent. Markets, including information markets, are in and
of society, and also serve other important social purposes. The argument that
government cannot regulate to promote these other purposes—when plainly
it can and does—is absurd.
Entirely apart from considerations of market structure, moreover, we
routinely prohibit certain uses of gathered information that we deem inconsistent with shared notions of human dignity and equality. For example, we
prohibit race-based classification by private parties in virtually every aspect
of commercial life without regard to whether statistical correlations exist
between, say, race and loan default rates. 178 No one seriously argues that this
practice infringes on protected speech. As discussed in Part IV, moreover,
the conclusion that the data captured by transactional profiling yield an accurate portrait of the individual, and that more of it will yield a better portrait, is
open to serious criticism. We might reasonably conclude that the First
Amendment does not forbid giving dignity principles broader scope.
Balancing speech claims against data privacy claims also requires consideration of “information as property” in a wholly different sense. Arguments from speech assume a resolution of the property question favorable to
data processors, and thus no conflict between property rights and speech
rights. If personally-identified data is no one’s property, or property of the
person who collects it, then of course this is correct. No conflict exists; to
the contrary, any property interests that do exist are added to the scales on
the side of (data processors’) speech. But if, instead, personally-identified
data is the property or quasi-property of the individual to whom it refers,
then data processors’ asserted speech rights cannot be absolute, and may not
prevail at all. 179
By the same token, data privacy opponents ignore the implications of
their own freedom-of-contract paradigm for arguments from freedom of
178. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994) (employment); id. §§ 3601-3604 (1994) (housing).
179. Compare Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (holding copyright
claims limited in some circumstances by First Amendment concerns), Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S.
501 (1946) (same for real property rights), and New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc.,
971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992) (same for trademark rights), with Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474
(1988) (holding First Amendment claims limited by residential real property rights), San Francisco
Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987) (same for sui generis
statutory right to control uses of “Olympic”), Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471
U.S. 539 (1985) (same for copyright), and Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (same for commercial real property rights). Frisby is particularly suggestive, for there the Court invoked perso nhood-related interests in the privacy of the home to support speech restrictions. See Frisby, 487
U.S. at 484.
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speech. Courts routinely enforce private, contractual restrictions on expression. 180 It is hard to see why contractual restrictions on the use and exchange
of personally-identified data should be presumptively unenforceable. 181
The proper relation between competing property rights and speech rights,
and between freedom of contract and freedom of speech, is bitterly contested. 182 Moreover, I would argue that speech concerns were given insufficient weight in most (but not all) of the cases just cited. My purpose here is
not to locate either boundary at a particular point, but simply to point out the
illogic of concluding that a First Amendment right to exchange personallyidentified data trumps any and all rights that individuals might assert to prevent such exchange. Here again, recourse to neutral, categorical arguments
about the paramount importance of speech rights masks a basic inequality in
our understanding of who may enjoy these rights. If the powerful may exert
property rights or invoke contractual obligations to prevent or limit speech,
so too may others. 183 Juxtaposing data privacy opponents’ “speech” arguments with their arguments from “property” compounds the inequality.
Taken together, these arguments assert that personally-identified data may be
their property or their speech, as it suits them. 184
For information that has characteristics of both property and speech, the
questions whether speech rights should limit property or contract rights, and
if so how, can’t be resolved by formalistic resort to either category. (And
so—again, let me be quite clear—the assertion of countervailing property or
contract rights shouldn’t end the inquiry, either.) Instead, these are questions
that require context-sensitive balancing to answer. Again, copyright offers a
useful way to think about the interaction between competing property/contract and speech rights in personally-identified data. It is wellrecognized that the First Amendment protects some unauthorized uses of

180. See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991) (media source confidentiality agreement); Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (nondisclosure agreement imposed
pursuant to contract and fiduciary duty); RESTATEMENT (THIRD ) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 41
cmt. d (1995) (discussing trade secrecy confidentiality agreements); see also Kang, supra note 13,
at 1267-84 (proposing contract-based data privacy statute).
181. See Volokh, supra note 134 (acknowledging this point).
182. On the tension between speech rights and property rights, see Mark Cordes, Property
and the First Amendment, 31 U. RICH . L. REV. 1 (1997); and the sources cited in note 173 supra.
On the tension between speech rights and contract rights, see Alan E. Garfield, Promises of Silence:
Contract Law and Freedom of Speech, 83 CORNELL L. REV . 261 (1998); see also Cohen, Self-Help,
supra note 173; Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyrights in Cyberspace—Rights Without Laws?, 73 CHI.KENT L. REV . 1155 (1998); William W. Fisher III, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 CHI.KENT L. REV . 1203 (1998).
183. For the converse argument (and thus a more consistent speech absolutism), see Lemley
& Volokh, supra note 173, at 197-98 & n.230.
184. Cf. John O. McGinnis, The Once and Future Property-Based Vision of the First Amendment, 63 U. CHI. L. REV . 49, 70 (1996) (arguing that the First Amendment was intended to protect
“natural property rights” in speech).
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others’ copyrightable expression.185 It does not, however, shield any and all
unauthorized uses, and the point at which its protection ends is the point at
which authors’ property rights begin. 186 The one is a correlative of the other,
and the precise location of the boundary between the two is a function of
public policy concerns. The same is true of the boundary between speech
and contract; the argument now in vogue that “contract” is different than
“property” and so trumps public policy limits on copyright commits exactly
the error I seek to avoid.187
It bears repeating, once again, that data privacy protection would rest on
very different policy concerns than copyright; thus, we might not choose to
strike the balance between speech and property, or between speech and contract, in the same way. What copyright reminds us is that we may choose the
boundary between data privacy rights and speech rights with both ownership
and expressive freedoms in mind. Identifying property/contract claims in
tension with speech claims doesn’t end the analysis; it begins it.
*

*

*

*

The speech objection to data privacy regulation is important, but not absolute. Calling data exchange “speech” doesn’t mean it can’t be regulated,
and doesn’t (without more) tell us much about the sorts of regulation to allow. Balancing data privacy concerns against the speech rights of third parties requires closer consideration of both the nature of ownership and
contractual interests in personally-identified information and the extent to
which data privacy regulation is really directed at the exchange of information as property rather than as speech. Whether speech trumps privacy, in
other words, depends to a considerable extent on our understandings of property, choice, and information—and thus illustrates, again, both the ways in
which the conventional understandings of these categories reinforce each
other and the ways in which different understandings might yield different
answers. Part VI explores a theory of data privacy that these different understandings might support—one that begins with consideration of the developmental conditions that are necessary for individuals to become
autonomous decisionmakers and speakers in their own right.

185. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 555-60.
186. See id.
187. See, e.g., Bell, supra note 41; Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace,
1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 217; Merges, supra note 54; Nimmer, supra note 40; Maureen A.
O’Rourke, Copyright Preemption After the ProCD Case: A Market-Based Approach, 12 BERKELEY
T ECH. L.J. 53 (1997). See generally Cohen, supra note 44, at 481-90, 517-38 (analyzing this argument and rejecting it as a matter of economic theory); Cohen, Self-Help, supra note 173, at 1128-37
(analyzing this argument and rejecting it as a matter of copyright law and policy).
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VI. BECOMING: TOWARD A DYNAMIC T HEORY OF INFORMATIONAL
PRIVACY
It is conventional to justify trade in personally-identified data with reference to individual liberty. Yet, as this discussion has shown, on sustained
examination the concern with the individuals who are data subjects proves
relatively superficial. The rhetorics of liberty mask the fact that, at a more
fundamental level, data privacy discourse has been driven by concerns for
the autonomy of those who would objectify individuals—with the rights of
the data processor as owner, trader, vendor, speaker, chooser. If we are serious about fostering individual freedom in reality as well as in rhetoric, this is
an odd result.
What is needed, instead, is a dynamic theory of informational privacy—
one that focuses on the conditions for meaningful autonomy in fact. The theory must be grounded in a considered appreciation of the benefits of shadow
as well as those of sunlight. This Part lays the theoretical and practical foundations for an autonomy-based approach to data privacy protection, and argues that such protection need not threaten the important social and political
benefits that access to information provides.
A. The Values of Informational Privacy
Prevailing market-based approaches to data privacy policy—including
“solutions” in the form of tradable privacy rights or heightened disclosure
requirements before consent—treat preferences for informational privacy as
a matter of individual taste, entitled to no more (and often much less) weight
than preferences for black shoes over brown or red wine over white. But the
values of informational privacy are far more fundamental. A degree of freedom from scrutiny and categorization by others promotes important noninstrumental values, and serves vital individual and collective ends.
First, informational autonomy comports with important values concerning the fair and just treatment of individuals within society. From Kant to
Rawls, a central strand of Western philosophical tradition emphasizes respect
for the fundamental dignity of persons, and a concomitant commitment to
egalitarianism in both principle and practice. 188 Advocates of strong data
privacy protection argue that these principles have clear and very specific
implications for the treatment of personally-identified data: They require
that we forbid data-processing practices that treat individuals as mere conglomerations of transactional data, or that rank people as prospective customers, tenants, neighbors, employees, or insureds based on their financial or
188. See IMMANUEL KANT , T HE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 73-74, 231-32 (Mary Gregor ed.
& trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (1797); JOHN RAWLS , A THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed.
1999).
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genetic desirability. The drafters of the European Data Protection Directive
agreed with this characterization; the Directive is explicitly grounded in “the
fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons.”189
Arguably, however, the leap from normative first principles to the European model of fair information practice requires further explanation. In theory, at least, a market model of tradable privacy rights is fully consistent with
first-order normative commitments to dignity and equality, in that it treats
each individual as an autonomous, rational actor and presumes that all individuals are equally capable of ascertaining and pursuing the goals that will
maximize their own happiness. As discussed in Parts III and IV, though,
individuals experience substantially less choice about data-processing practice, and enjoy substantially less agency, than the rational-actor model predicts. The disjunction arises because the rational-actor model (even modified
to acknowledge preferences for privacy as legitimate) devotes no attention to
how individuals attain autonomy in fact—that is, to how we develop the capacity and facility for choice.
Autonomous individuals do not spring full-blown from the womb. We
must learn to process information and to draw our own conclusions about the
world around us. We must learn to choose, and must learn something before
we can choose anything. Here, though, information theory suggests a paradox: “Autonomy” connotes an essential independence of critical faculty and
an imperviousness to influence. But to the extent that information shapes
behavior, autonomy is radically contingent upon environment and circumstance. The only tenable resolution—if “autonomy” is not to degenerate into
the simple, stimulus-response behavior sought by direct marketers—is to
underdetermine environment. Autonomy in a contingent world requires a
zone of relative insulation from outside scrutiny and interference—a field of
operation within which to engage in the conscious construction of self. The
solution to the paradox of contingent autonomy, in other words, lies in a second paradox: To exist in fact as well as in theory, autonomy must be nurtured. 190
A realm of autonomous, unmonitored choice, in turn, promotes a vital
diversity of speech and behavior. The recognition that anonymity shelters
constitutionally-protected decisions about speech, belief, and political and
intellectual association—decisions that otherwise might be chilled by un-

189. See European Data Protection Directive, supra note 4, at art. 1(1).
190. This insight appears, in more limited form, in the literature on organizational theory and
psychology. This literature recognizes that autonomy is an important factor in workplace productivity, and requires investment and forethought to develop. See, e.g., Steve Williams, An Organizational Model of Choice: A Theoretical Analysis Differentiating Choice, Personal Control, and SelfDetermination, 124 GENETIC SOC . & GEN . PSYCH . MONOGRAPHS 465 (1998) (summarizing research).
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popularity or simple difference—is part of our constitutional tradition. 191
But the benefits of informational autonomy (defined to include the condition
in which no information is recorded about nonanonymous choices) extend to
a much wider range of human activity and choice. We do not experiment
only with beliefs and associations, but also with every other conceivable type
of taste and behavior that expresses and defines self. The opportunity to experiment with preferences is a vital part of the process of learning, and
learning to choose, that every individual must undergo. 192
The benefits of informational privacy are related to, but distinct from,
those afforded by seclusion from visual monitoring. It is well-recognized
that respite from visual scrutiny affords individuals an important measure of
psychological repose. Within our society, at least, we are accustomed to
physical spaces within which we can be unobserved, and intrusion into those
spaces is experienced as violating the boundaries of self.193 But the scrutiny,
and the repose, can be informational as well as visual, and this does not depend entirely on whether the behavior takes place “in private.” The injury,
here, does not lie in the exposure of formerly private behaviors to public
view, but in the dissolution of the boundaries that insulate different spheres
of behavior from one another. 194 The universe of all information about all
record-generating behaviors generates a “picture” that, in some respects, is
more detailed and intimate than that produced by visual observation, and that
picture is accessible, in theory and often in reality, to just about anyone who
wants to see it. In such a world, we all may be more cautious.
The point is not that people will not learn under conditions of noprivacy, but that they will learn differently, and that the experience of being

191. See Cohen, Right to Read Anonymously, supra note 173, at 1006-14; Kreimer, supra
note 9, at 59-71. See generally Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the “Chilling Effect,” 58 B.U. L. REV . 685 (1978) (defining and discussing this “chilling” effect); Lee Tien, Who’s Afraid of Anonymous Speech? McIntyre and the Internet, 75 OR . L. REV.
117 (1996) (defending online anonymity).
192. See Anita L. Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 WM . & MARY L. REV . 723, 754-55 (1999)
(“Privacy is a matter of escaping as well as embracing encumbrances of identity. Without adequate
privacy, there can be no meaningful identities to embrace or escape, and no opportunities to engage
in meaningful reflection, conversation, and debate about the grounds for embracing, escaping, and
modifying particular identities.”); Lawrence O. Gostin, Health Information Privacy, 80 CORNELL L.
REV . 451, 514 (1995) (discussing and developing a conceptual framework for health information
privacy); Kreimer, supra note 9, at 69-70 (“[E]xposure as the author of an action or statement links
that action to our identity; the broader the exposure, the more indissoluble the link and the harder it
is to disavow it.”).
193. See ALAN F. WESTIN , PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 32-42, 57-60 (1967); Thomas Scanlon,
Thomson on Privacy, 4 P HIL . & P UB . AFF . 315, 317 (1975); Barry Schwartz, The Social Psychology
of Privacy, 73 AM . J. SOCIOL . 741, 745-51 (1968).
194. See Helen Nissenbaum, Protecting Privacy in an Information Age: The Problem of Privacy in Public, 17 L. & PHIL . 559 (1998); Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy:
Community and Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 CAL . L. REV . 957, 984-85 (1989); Jonathan
Schonsheck, Privacy and Discrete “Social Spheres,” 7 ETHICS & BEHAV . 221 (1997).
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watched will constrain, ex ante, the acceptable spectrum of belief and behavior.195 Pervasive monitoring of every first move or false start will, at the
margin, incline choices toward the bland and the mainstream. The result will
be a subtle yet fundamental shift in the content of our character, a blunting
and blurring of rough edges and sharp lines. But rough edges and sharp lines
have intrinsic, archetypal value within our culture. Their philosophical differences aside, the coolly rational Enlightenment thinker, the unconventional
Romantic dissenter, the skeptical pragmatist, and the iconoclastic postmodernist all share a deep-rooted antipathy toward unreflective conformism. 196
The condition of no-privacy threatens not only to chill the expression of eccentric individuality, but also, gradually, to dampen the force of our aspir ations to it. 197
The autonomy fostered by informational privacy also generates more
concrete collective benefits. Development of the capacity for autonomous
choice is an indispensable condition for reasoned participation in the governance of the community and its constituent institutions—political, economic,
and social.
The cornerstone of a democratic society is informed and deliberate selfgovernance. The formation and reformation of political preferences—essential both for reasoned public debate and informed exercise of the franchise—
follows the pattern already discussed: Examination chills experimentation
with the unorthodox, the unpopular, and the merely unfinished. A robust and
varied debate on matters of public concern requires the opportunity to experiment with self-definition in private, and (if one desires) to keep distinct
social, commercial, and political associations separate from one another. 198
Here again the point is relative. People will still make choices under conditions of no-privacy, and targeted commercial advertising can be used to
195. Research in cognitive psychology indicates that lack of privacy makes people both less
inclined to experiment and less inclined to seek help. See Stuart A. Karabenick & John R. Knapp,
Effects of Computer Privacy on Help-Seeking, 18 J. APPLIED SOC . PSYCH . 461 (1988); NEW
DIRECTIONS IN HELPING : HELP-SEEKING (Jeffrey D. Fisher, Arie Nadler & Bella M. DePaulo eds.,
1983); see also Kreimer, supra note 9, at 52-53 n.145. Individuals who experiment with unpopular
views or behavior also must consider the possibility of physical, economic, or social sanctions. See
Kreimer, supra note 9, at 39-54; Gostin, supra note 192, at 490-91.
196. See, e.g., RICHARD A. P OSNER , OVERCOMING LAW (1995); STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN , T HE
FIRST AMENDMENT , DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE (1990); DUNCAN KENNEDY , A CRITIQUE OF
ADJUDICATION (FIN DE SIECLE ) (1997).
197. See Schwartz, supra note 93, at 1654-57. Postmodern literary theory holds that to name
a thing or person is prima facie to limit its potentiality. See JUDITH BUTLER, EXCITABLE SPEECH :
A P OLITICS OF THE PERFORMATIVE 2-7 (1997). This reasoning has been invoked to support limits
on hate speech, on the ground that such speech has “performative” significance. See id. at 2-7.
This is not to say that direct marketing and hate speech are the same or even comparable—plainly,
they are not—but rather that there are categories of speech that have concrete impact on an individual’s development as an autonomous speaker, and thus exist uneasily at the boundary between expression and action.
198. See Kreimer, supra note 9, at 59-71; Schwartz, supra note 93, at 1650-54.
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manufacture political preferences (or political apathy) as well. But if we do
not wish to live in communities governed by apathy, impulse, or precautio nary conformism, we must produce individuals capable of governing themselves. 199
The same qualities that produce the capacity for political selfgovernment also produce innovation in markets and in the governance of
market institutions. I have argued that the welfare of markets is properly
viewed as subordinate to the welfare of society as a whole, but it does not
follow that markets are unimportant. The health of markets as institutions
within a democratic society is vitally important to overall social welfare.
And dynamic, competitive markets require inventors as well as consumers
and entrepreneurs as well as audiences. 200 Inventiveness and entrepreneurship, in turn, require the ability to think outside or around existing, predic table technological and social patterns. A regime built on pervasive practices
of monitoring, prediction, and preference-shaping is far more likely to stifle
these habits of independent thought than to stimulate them.
At the same time, though, the insulation provided by informational privacy also plays a subtler, more conservative role in reinforcing the existing
social fabric. Sociologist Erving Goffman demonstrated that the construction of social facades to mediate between self and community is both instinctive and expected. 201 Alan Westin describes this social dimension of
privacy as “reserve.”202 This characterization, though, seems incomplete.
On Goffman’s account, the construction of social personae isn’t just about
withholding information that we don’t want others to have. It is about defining the parameters of social interaction in ways that maximize social ease,
and thus is about collective as well as individual comfort.203 We do not need,
or even want, to know each other that well. Less information makes routine
interactions easier; we are then free to choose, consensually and without embarrassment, the interactions that we wish to treat as less routine. Informational privacy, in short, is a constitutive element of a civil society in the
broadest sense of that term.
Last, but hardly least, a societal commitment to informational privacy
has an important role to play in defining our collective vision of the role of
199. Cf. Netanel, supra note 160, at 343 (“A state whose citizenry has not internalized these
skills and values will rule through fiat and obedience, without any sense, so vital to our understanding of democracy, that its laws and social norms originate in the commitments of a selfgoverning polity.”). Netanel notes, as well, that self-governance also occurs outside the formal
bounds of “government.” See id.
200. See, e.g., SAMUEL BOWLES & RICHARD EDWARDS , UNDERSTANDING CAPITALISM :
COMPETITION, COMMAND , AND CHANGE IN THE U.S. ECONOMY (1985); JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER ,
CAPITALISM , SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY (1942).
201. See ERVING GOFFMAN , T HE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959).
202. See W ESTIN, supra note 193, at 32.
203. See GOFFMAN, supra note 201, at 8-10, 113-40, 229-33; Post, supra note 194, at 984-86.
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information technologies, and technique more broadly, within society.204
Technological progress affords a yardstick for measuring human achievement, but not the only or most important one. 205 To appreciate other measures of progress, we must be sensitive to the limits of technique, and
recognize the hubris inherent in pretensions to total prediction and control. 206
A protected zone of informational autonomy is valuable, in short, precisely
because it reminds us what we cannot measure.
B. Informational Privacy in Practice
As the foregoing discussion shows, there are compelling theoretical and
practical justifications for legislating strong data privacy protection that creates and preserves a zone of informational autonomy for individuals. To be
both effective and constitutional, data privacy legislation must solve three
difficult problems. First, it must strike the right balance between ownership
and speech concerns, by defining the scope of protection in a manner that
excludes constitutionally-privileged uses of personally-identified data. Second, it must define the appropriate parameters of choice about privacy practices, to ensure that consent to the collection, use, and exchange of
personally-identified data is informed and meaningful. Finally, it must incorporate additional protections that hold the data processing industry accountable, both to individuals and to the larger society within which it
operates, for its practices regarding information use.
Although neither speech nor “truth” concerns preclude strong data privacy protection, legislation designed to protect informational privacy nonetheless must provide for both constitutionally-required and socially-valued
uses of personally-identified information. Data privacy opponents of widely
varying persuasions argue that this simply cannot be done. Libertarian data
privacy opponents contend that a right to prevent use and disclosure of personally-identified data necessarily threatens valuable and constitutionallyprotected journalistic and research activities.207 From the communitarian
movement, meanwhile, comes the argument that data privacy rights would
foreclose uses of personally-identified data that protect the public health and
safety. 208 Both libertarian and communitarian objections, however, assume
that any entitlement in personally-identified data must take the form of a tra204. See text accompanying notes 119-121 supra (discussing relationship between information technology and the construction of knowledge).
205. Cf. Margaret Chon, Postmodern “Progress”: Reconsidering the Copyright and Patent
Power, 43 DE PAUL L. REV . 97 (1993) (arguing that the definition of “progress” is socially constructed and should be shaped by social values and human priorities).
206. See generally BORGMANN , supra note 2 (identifying prediction and control as central,
and deeply flawed, organizing principles of modern (Western) society).
207. See SINGLETON , supra note 51, at 7; Volokh, supra note 134.
208. See AMITAI ETZIONI , T HE LIMITS OF PRIVACY (1999).
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ditional “property” right—a right against all comers and all uses. Again, the
example of intellectual property, and in particular copyright, shows that this
need not be so. Copyright confers a set of enumerated rights against particular types of conduct, but does not forbid other, unenumerated uses of
protected works.209 In addition, the Copyright Act specifies a number of important exceptions to owners’ rights; these limitations are expressly designed
to balance competing public policy goals.210 Similarly, a theory of informational privacy may, and should, be crafted to preserve the benefits of sunlight.
The objection that broad data privacy protection will threaten press freedoms is worth taking seriously. The threat is, however, avoidable if the right
is defined narrowly. The First Amendment right to publish personallyidentified facts is not absolute. It is constrained, first, by a newsworthiness
(or “public concern”) limitation. 211 Most facts about individual transactions
will not be “newsworthy” in the constitutional sense; larger trends in purchasing habits may well be, but (as discussed below) data privacy protection
won’t prevent the study of these. More important, the First Amendment
protects the right to publish information lawfully obtained through one’s own
efforts.212 It neither presumes nor guarantees a preexisting social practice
consisting of the pervasive collection and aggregation of personallyidentified data by third-party “infomediaries.” A reporter may follow a public figure into the store, and we also may decide that First Amendment values
require statutory leeway to obtain transactional data about named individuals

209. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 106A (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
210. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(b) (1994) (excluding from copyright protection ideas, met hods of operation, and the like); id. § 107 (fair use doctrine); id. § 108 (copying privileges for libraries); id. § 109(a) (first sale doctrine) ; id. § 110 (Supp. IV 1998) (public performance and display
exemptions for nonprofit activities and organizations); Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv.,
Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991) (holding that denial of copyright protection for facts is constit utionally compelled); Cohen, supra note 44, at 543-51, 555-59 (discussing shared public benefits
produced by copyright limitations); Lemley, supra note 38, at 993-99 (same); Jessica Litman, The
Public Domain , 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990) (explaining the ways in which a rich public domain
bolstered by copyright limitations promotes ongoing creative progress).
211. See, e.g., Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989); Edelman, supra note 147, at 122835; Kang, supra note 13, at 1280 n.348. In theory, at least, this limitation allows tort liability for
invasion of privacy based on publication of private facts, or of a private person’s name or likeness.
As Edelman and Kang note, courts take an extremely broad view of what constitutes a matter of
public concern. Yet even so, the mundane transactional details that fill commercial databanks are
unlikely to qualify. Although a tort action may not currently lie for publication of such details, see
William J. Fenrich, Common Law Protection of Individuals’ Rights in Personal Information, 65
FORDHAM L. REV . 951, 989-94 (1996), data privacy legislation may constitutionally bar publication. Cf. Joseph Elford, Trafficking in Stolen Information: A “Hierarchy of Rights” Approach to
the Private Facts Tort, 105 YALE L.J. 727 (1995) (offering a reconceptualization designed to preserve the private facts tort and extend it to profiling activities).
212. See Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 533. For this reason, the libertarian argument that data privacy protection will chill casual conversation about others, see Volokh, supra note 134, is simply
silly.
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directly from (certain types of) vendors, if the vendors are willing. 213 But a
right against the accumulation, reuse, and sale of collections of personallyidentified information threatens nothing to which the press, or anyone else, is
entitled. 214
The argument that data privacy protection will threaten valuable research, on the other hand, mistakenly conflates the two very different activities of data analysis and direct-to-consumer communication. Certainly,
much valuable research proceeds by collecting and processing data from and
about individuals.215 But in most cases, the data need not remain personallyidentified or -identifiable for the research to proceed and to generate its intended results. Empirical studies of population samples seek knowledge
about groups, not about individuals.216 A statutory requirement that research
data be stripped of personal identifiers will hinder subsequent efforts to market new, improved products directly to targeted individuals, but it won’t hinder efforts to study demographics, tastes, and trends.
Certain industries do require the exchange of personally-identified data
in order to function. Prominent examples include the credit reporting, health
care and biomedical research, insurance and financial services, and higher
education industries. All serve important social needs, and none would survive an outright ban on the accumulation and exchange of personallyidentified data. It doesn’t follow, though, that members of these industries
should enjoy blanket immunity from data privacy protection. 217 Allowing
213. Sector-specific laws guaranteeing informational privacy for video and cable patrons
don’t even provide this much, and (as far as I can tell) no one thinks these laws violate the First
Amendment. See 18 U.S.C. § 2710; 47 U.S.C. § 551; Kang, supra note 12, at 1282.
214. As Part V.B noted, such a right arguably places an indirect burden on direct marketers’
communications to consumers. See text accompanying notes 172-173 supra. Even so, however,
Part VI.A. delineates very substantial government interests, and the restriction is appropriately tailored. See text accompanying notes 188-206 supra; see generally United States v. O’Brien, 391
U.S. 367 (1968) (articulating standard for First Amendment review of laws that indirectly burden
speech). Strong data privacy protection would not prevent direct marketers from communicating
with consumers via direct solicitation, or from tailoring their messages to the demographic characteristics of different customer pools; it simply would limit their ability to categorize individual consumers. See text accompanying notes 101-105 supra. More fundamentally, the examples discussed
in Part V.B illustrate that resort to O’Brien analysis may not be necessary. We don’t, for example,
require all securities regulations to pass O’Brien scrutiny simply because there might (and undoubtedly will) be indirect effects on someone’s speech.
215. One notable example is the census, which is also constitutionally-mandated. See U.S.
CONST . art I, § 2, cl. 3.
216. But cf. Burkert, supra note 60, at 131-33 (noting that in some circumstances group profiles may be used unfairly).
Situations in which data must remain personally-identifiable can be handled with appropriate
sector-specific regulation. See, e.g., Gostin, supra note 192 (discussing the problem of protecting
privacy in personal health care information).
217. All of these industries are already subject to a degree of privacy-related regulation. See,
e.g., Graham-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, Title V, §§ 501-527,
113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (financial services); Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 16811681t (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (consumer credit reporting); 20 U.S.C. §1232(g) (1994 & Supp. IV
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privileged industries carte blanche to determine which items of data to collect and share would endorse the categorical error discussed in Part III: It
would inscribe the technocratic paradigm of knowledge, and of power over
knowledge, that data privacy protection seeks to avoid. Instead (and the only
alternative), data privacy legislation must include special provisions covering
these industries, and specifying the types of information to which the privilege extends and the standards of fair information practice governing their
use.
The communitarian social-benefit objection raises a slightly different,
and more difficult, problem. The uses of personally-identified data claimed
as beneficial—sexual offender tracking, HIV notification programs, and the
like—all involve government.218 This article has focused largely on the privacy problems created by large commercial databases. I don’t intend to suggest, though, that government collection and cross-referencing of personal
data poses a lesser privacy threat. We should be concerned, moreover, about
spillover effects—about private-sector access to data compiled by the government, and vice versa. A broadly-drafted prohibition on the transfer and
aggregation of personally-identified data, applicable to private and public
sectors alike, is the best way to minimize all of these threats. 219 We may
conclude that collection and use of particular items of data by particular governmental units is justifiable (or unavoidable).220 And in some cases, we
may conclude that the First Amendment or related concerns require government to disclose the data it has collected.221 But these facts don’t justify per1998) (higher education); Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. § 46.101 et seq. (1993) (biomedical research); se also U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, Proposed Rule, 64 FED . REG . 59,918 (Nov. 3, 1999) (health
care information).
218. Etzioni advocates strong protection against private-sector data processing activities. See
ETZIONI , supra note 208, at 141-82.
219. For a thorough summary of the data privacy rules that currently govern private and public sectors within the U.S., see SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 10.
220. I take no position on the specific uses that Etzioni advocates. See id.
221. See, e.g., United Reporting Publ’g Corp. v. California Highway Patrol, 146 F.3d 1133
(9th Cir. 1998), rev’d sub nom. Los Angeles Police Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 120 S.
Ct. 483 (1999) (names of arrestees) (holding that the state was not constitutionally required to disclose this information); Federal Election Commission v. Political Contributions Data, Inc., 943 F.2d
190 (2d Cir. 1991) (names of contributors to political campaigns) (holding that a statute requiring
disclosures but restricting commercial use of information struck a constitutionally permissible balance). I cite these cases solely to illustrate the sorts of data that are likely to raise issues of legit imate public concern; I take no position on the breadth of the disclosures authorized by the actual
statutes at issue, or on whether the First Amendment should be interpreted to require that these
items be disclosed at all. My analysis suggests, moreover, that stricter “commercial use” restrictions for government-disclosed information would be entirely permissible, and good policy. And in
some cases, we should conclude that the First Amendment or other constitutional provisions bar
disclosure. See Cohen, Right to Read Anonymously, supra note 173, at 1003-19 (arguing that First
Amendment protects against disclosure of reading habits and other speech-related preferences);
Kreimer, supra note 9, at 62-71.
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vasive government accumulation, aggregation, and cross-referencing of personally-identified data any more than the public benefits of credit reporting
justify allowing credit bureaus unlimited freedom to design their own data
processing mandates. The baseline presumption should be one of strong data
privacy protection; exceptions should be carefully considered and narrowly
circumscribed.
The next set of questions that data privacy legislation must address concerns the conditions for consent to the release and reuse of personallyidentified data. The first question, of course, is why this information needs
to be market-alienable at all. As discussed in Part II, exchange value is a
customary attribute of property rights, but not a necessary one. Yet people
may have legitimate reasons for trading privacy for value in particular cases,
when the benefits and costs are reasonably capable of estimation and reasonably immediate. Presumably for this reason, even the European Data
Protection Directive does not require Member States to prohibit trade in most
types of personally-identified data; instead, it authorizes a marketinalienability approach only for particularly sensitive categories of data, such
as those relating to race, religion, and sexual preference. 222 Because these
latter sorts of information are especially closely related to dignity concerns,
and especially likely to be used in dignity-destroying ways, we may wish to
do likewise. Then, though, we must consider the vast majority of data that
this rule will not cover.
As Part III.B explains, current data-processing practices provide individuals with so little information about the uses of personally-identified data,
and their associated costs and benefits, that consent to these practices cannot
plausibly be called “informed.”223 In particular, the farther removed a particular use of personally-identified data is from its initial collection—whether
in terms of subject matter, time, or the nature of the entity making the use—
the more difficult it will be for individuals to foresee the use, estimate its
likelihood, and arrive at an ex ante valuation. Failure to correct for these
information problems could negate every protection the statute seeks to provide. It is far from clear that the adoption of P3P technology alone will do
the job; P3P will allow individuals to indicate at least some of their preferences (once, up front) at a higher level of granularity, but won’t necessarily
require vendors to provide the kind of detail about contemplated uses that
individuals need to make these choices in the first place. 224 To be effective,
data privacy protection must define the conditions for effective consent.
First and most obviously, consent cannot be meaningful as to unknown
uses or unspecified recipients. In theory, effective data privacy legislation
222. See European Data Protection Directive, supra note 4, at art. 8.
223. See text accompanying notes 82-88 supra.
224. See text accompanying notes 64-65 supra.
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should require that individuals be given specific information, and the opportunity to consent or refuse, as to each contemplated reuse or transfer. The
European Data Protection Directive adopts this fully-specified model. 225 As
a practical matter, it may be sufficient to aggregate certain categories of use
or transfer, and require express consent as to each category. Some uses
and/or recipients, however, may be so significant that most people would
prefer to require particularized consent—for example, the sale of information
about grocery or alcohol purchases to employers or health insurers.
Relatedly, provisions defining the scope of consent must specify what
constitutes a business enterprise for purposes of privileges to use personallyidentified data. Given trends toward horizontal and vertical integration, a
broad view of who may exercise the privileges granted by individuals could
surrender substantially more control than intended. To avoid this result, both
use privileges and any accompanying “legitimate business purpose” or
“functionally necessary” exceptions should extend only to the specific business unit or subunit that collected the data initially. 226 The same proviso,
moreover, applies to government reuse of personally-identified data. Assuming that the government may compel the provision of at least some types
of personal information, it does not follow that the information should be
shared across governmental units as a matter of routine practice.
Second, the quality of consent attenuates over time. As Part III.B. discusses, it is very difficult to predict the kinds of uses likely to be made of
personally-identified data ten years hence, much less to estimate their significance. 227 Logically, then, consent to the reuse or transfer of personallyidentified data should expire after a fixed time period; uses extending past
the specified time period should require a new agreement. Like the enumerated-rights model, the notion of time-limited consent has precedent in the
Copyright Act, which gives authors who transfer their copyrights a power of
termination after thirty-five years. 228 This “termination of transfers” provision is intended to protect authors in the event of dramatic and unforeseeable
increases in the value of a work, or unforeseeable improvements in distrib ution technology.229 A similar provision in data privacy legislation could
protect individuals against new and unforeseeable uses of their information.
225. See European Data Protection Directive, supra note 4, at arts. 6, 7, 11, 14.
226. Many commentators have noted that “legitimate business purpose” exceptions introduce
vague and potentially ruinous loopholes into data privacy law. See SWIRE & L ITAN, supra note 13,
at 34-35; Kang, supra note 13, at 1271; Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards for Fair Information
Practice in the U.S. Private Sector, 80 IOWA L. REV . 497, 519 (1996). Jerry Kang’s proposal to
allow routine use only to the extent “functionally necessary” to the operation of the data processor’s
business is a significant improvement. See Kang, supra note 13, at 1271-72.
227. See text accompanying notes 87-88 supra.
228. See 17 U.S.C. § 203 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)
229. See H.R. REP . NO . 94-1476, at 124 (1976); 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER ,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 9.02 (1999).
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The duration of consent to reuse of personally-identified data should be substantially shorter, however. In the case of copyright, both author and publisher have an interest in allowing the publisher enough time to recoup the
value of its investment in the work. Where personally-identified data are
concerned, there is no such commonality of interest.
Third, consent to limited reuse and exchange of personally-identified
data is meaningless if recipients may transfer the data to third parties without
the restrictions that accompanied the initial transfer. Instead, as the European Data Protection Directive provides, each use or transfer by a third-party
recipient should require a separate act of consent. 230 This recommendation
diverges markedly from copyright policy. Under the Copyright Act, an
author may control only the first sale of her work. 231 This, though, is a good
example of an area where the different policies underlying copyright protection and data privacy protection should matter. The first sale doctrine represents a considered judgment that society’s interest in the broad dissemination
of creative works, and in the free alienability of tangible goods, outweighs
the author’s interest in seeking additional remuneration. 232 Durable restrictions on the uses of personally-identified data, in contrast, promote the individual’s interest in dignity and autonomy, and there is no comparable
societal interest in unfettered dissemination. Instead, as Part VI.A explains,
society’s interests align substantially with the individual’s.233
It may be objected that these provisions would define consent so narrowly as to leave no meaningful scope for individual choices to surrender
informational privacy. This, though, repeats the categorical error discussed
in Part III by ignoring the institutional parameters of choice. Society has
always defined the conditions of effective consent; that’s what contract law
is all about. 234 Without question, data privacy regulation would impose a
collective decision that where personally-identified information is concerned,
the definition of consent should be narrower. If informational privacy is a
foundational requirement for individual self-determination and collective
self-government, this sort of “coercion” is essential, and is no coercion at
all. 235
Finally, effective data privacy legislation also must incorporate other,
non-consent-based requirements for fair information practice. The notion
230. See European Data Protection Directive, supra note 4, at arts. 6, 7.
231. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1994). But see 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (1994 & Supp. 1998) (prohibiting
tampering with technological measures designed to limit access to a copyrighted work).
232. See H.R. REP . NO . 94-1476, 124 (1976); Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339
(1908); 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER , NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.12 (1999).
233. See text accompanying notes 188-206 supra.
234. See Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV .
L. REV . 501, 529-31 (1999).
235. See Allen, supra note 192, at 739-40.
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that informed consent alone is sufficient to protect individual interests in the
uses of personally-identified data is a peculiarly American one. 236 Internationally-agreed principles of fair information practice require a variety of
other substantive and procedural protections. In particular, fair information
practice requires attention to the transparency of data-processing practices,
the security of collected data, access to one’s own personally-identified data
and the opportunity to correct inaccuracies, and the accountability of data
processors.237 These principles are designed to ensure that data processors
are held accountable to individuals in fact as well as in theory, by affording
individuals simple, effective procedures for holding data processors both to
the terms to which they have agreed and to basic standards of fair play.
Accountability has collective as well as individual dimensions, moreover. As Part IV.B discussed, profiling practices implicate not only individualized notions of consent and fair process, but also collective values about
the respect due individuals. 238 For this reason, the European Data Protection
Directive grants each individual the right “not to be subject to a decision
which produces legal effects concerning him or significantly affects him and
which is based solely on automated processing of data intended to evaluate
certain personal aspects relating to him.”239 Similarly, data privacy legislation should incorporate safeguards to ensure that data processors are held
accountable to society for at least some types of choices. The exact form and
content of these safeguards are subjects for collective discussion.
*

*

*

*

Informational privacy is an essential building block for the kind of individuality, and the kind of society, that we say we value. Legislating for informational privacy, in turn, requires a different kind of attention to the
categories that have dominated the discussion about data privacy protection.
Effective data privacy protection must delineate the appropriate boundary
between ownership and speech, specify the parameters for effective consent,
and impose meaningful procedural and substantive protections on information practices.
The detailed implementation of provisions to ensure fair information
practices is a subject for another article. It’s worth noting, here, that although the basic outlines of data privacy protection can be legislated along
the lines described here, the model I’ve proposed probably can’t be sustained
by legislation alone. Some fair information practices are likely to require
236. I am indebted to Joel Reidenberg for reminding me of this point.
237. See European Data Protection Directive, supra note 4, at Arts. 10-21; Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data , OECD Doc. C(80)58
(Final) (1980).
238. See text accompanying notes 126-133 supra.
239. European Data Protection Directive, supra note 4, at art. 15(1) (emphasis added).

1436

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:1373

ongoing regulatory oversight. Others are likely to require rulemaking at
regular intervals; for example, it’s hard to see how legislation alone could
define categories of uses and recipients for disclosure purposes against a
background of constantly changing commercial practice. These and other
details of a comprehensive data privacy regime will demand careful consideration. This article has simply sought to clear away the theoretical obstacles
to the discussion, so that the project of designing concrete legal protections
for informational privacy can proceed.
VII. CONCLUSION: INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY BY D ESIGN
It is easy, and therefore tempting, to say that strong data privacy protection raises insurmountable jurisprudential dilemmas. But it is also wrong.
Personally-identified data is neither unambiguously data processors’ property
nor simply their speech—it cannot, in any case, be first one and then the
other, depending on which categorical argument works best—and the surrender of autonomy in exchange for the satisfaction of prefabricated preferences is not the only kind of choice. Invoking platonic ideals of ownership,
speech, truth, and choice just avoids the hard policy questions, and inscribes
in the guise of liberty a politics and practice of objectification. Wise information policy can, and should, do better.
There remains, however, one final objection: A charming academic
hobby-horse, but what of it? It has become commonplace (and, oxymoronically, a sign of great sophistication) to assert that legal guarantees of privacy
will be rendered empty by rapid technological change. On this view, strong
data privacy protection is a sentimental pipe dream—as grandiose as Canute’s, and with about as much chance of success.240 It doesn’t matter
whether informational privacy is good or bad, principled or not. We have
simply gone too far, too fast, to turn back.
I have tried to show, though, that the characterization of the data privacy
problem as driven by technological tradeoffs grossly oversimplifies the
choices that we face. The architectures of data collection are chosen. Thus
far, privacy considerations have not been uppermost in the design process,
but what is chosen can be changed.
In fact, technologists have made substantial headway toward the design
of technical parameters for the exercise of autonomous, anonymous choice.
Object-oriented programming techniques make it possible to endow individual items of data with broad ranges of attributes that specify the sorts of
processing permitted. Personally-identified data can be encoded with de240. See, e.g., DAVID BRIN , T HE TRANSPARENT SOCIETY : WILL TECHNOLOGY FORCE US T O
CHOOSE BETWEEN PRIVACY AND FREEDOM ? (1998); Polly Sprenger, Sun on Privacy: “Get Over
It,” W IRED NEWS, Jan. 26, 1999 <http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,17538,00.html>
(quoting Scott McNealy, the CEO of Sun Microsystems).
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tailed information about restrictions on use and exchange, or encased within
digital firewalls that prevent its aggregate extraction in personally-identified
form.241 In addition, as Phil Agre describes, digital technologies enable the
construction of “technologies of identity”—transactional systems that operate anonymously or pseudonymously, and so prevent personally-identified
data from being collected at all. 242 The growing array of options for the design of transactional systems reminds us (again) that “progress” is not unidirectional. We can choose the system or systems that best comports with
other social values and priorities.
It is also clear that, from a technological standpoint, strong data privacy
protection need not preclude a serious commitment to solving the very real
information problems that confront providers of goods and services in an
information society. What is necessary is to look beyond purported efficiency tradeoffs, and envision other possibilities. We can design information
systems that help vendors find and target customers. But we also can design
information systems that decouple information from intrusion, by helping
vendors learn about customer tastes and desires in aggregate. And we can
design information systems that help customers find vendors—in other
words, systems that reserve agency, and meaningful choice, to individuals.
Ultimately, we must use both technology and law to create and sustain
the conditions for meaningful, autonomous choice. 243 At minimum, how ever, law can and should establish a new set of institutional parameters that
supply incentives for the design of privacy-enhancing technologies to flourish. Legal protection alone cannot create or guarantee informational privacy.
But it is a place to begin.
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